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THE study from which this paper proceeds is an attempt to 
understand the labor injunction in the light of its comparatively 
brief history. 
The questions of labor law are indissociable from the ques- 
tion of what Madison called "the most difficult of all political 
arrangements"-that of so adjusting the conflicting claims of 
those with and those without property "as to give security to 
each and to promote the welfare of all." To deal with them 
on the basis only of what is contained in law books is to miss 
many factors which have influenced the judgments both of courts 
and of their critics. Those factors include conditions and events, 
personalities, faiths cherished with uncritical devotion, and a 
vast complex of forces of interest and desire among which 
genuine desire for social harmony, though it tends always to 
abdicate its vague power as mediator and to trust in the 
benevolence after victory of one or the other of the major pro- 
tagonists in social conflict, may not be so negligible as con- 
temporary disillusion inclines to assume. 
In the case of the American labor injunction the insufficiency 
of the law's own explanations of itself is singularly evident. 
The first reported instance of a labor injunction-in England 
* Research Associate, Yale School of Law; co-author of Contempt by 
Publication in the United States (1928) 28 COL. L. REV. 401, 525. 
15 ELLIOTT'S DEBATES (ed. of 1866) 580. Madison thought (in 1787) that 
when, "through the connections between the great capitalists in manufac- 
tures and commerce, and the numbers employed by them," the conflicting 
feelings of the two classes should attain "the operation natural to them 
in countries fully peopled," the chief danger of oppression would lie, not, 
as in monarchies, in want of sympathy in the government towards the 
people, but in the irresponsible power of the unpropertied majority. He 
hoped that a balance might be maintained through confining the repre- 
sentation of the unpropertied to the lower houses of legislative bodies. 
He seemed also to hope that opportunities for the accumulation of great 
wealth might be diminished, and the permanancy of accumulations defeated, 
"by the equalizing tendency of our laws." Ibid. 580-583. 
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in 1868 2-was of minor and deferred importance. The cases 
examined in this paper 3-summary punishments of strike sym- 
pathizers for contempt of court in obstructing the operation of 
railways in the hands of receivers-were of gieater consequence. 
And such reported cases as might have been resorted to by 
lawyers on the question of the legality of those summary punish- 
ments seem appropriately relegated to an appendix. The punish- 
ments were responsive less to legal principles than to emotions 
inspired by the great railway strike of 1877. And that strike 
was responsive to conditions concerning which it will be the first 
task of this paper to refresh recollection. 
I 
The economic expansion of the United State after the Civil 
War was disorderly.4 It involved enormous waste, both material 
2 Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551 (1868). Discussion 
of this case belongs in a later article. The case was not followed in the 
United States until Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307 (1888). 
It had meanwhile been but slightly noted-and then with reprobation: Pru- 
dential Assurance Co. v. Knott, L. R. 10 Ch. 142 (1875); Boston Diatite 
Co. v. Florence Manufacturing Co., 114 Mass. 69 (1873). 
3 Infra note 61. 
4 The following are among the works consulted in regard to the phenom- 
ena of the period: 8 RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1919); 5 
WILSON, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1903); 2 BEARD, THE RISE 
OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1927) 105-343; SHIPPEE, RECENT AMERICAN 
HISTORY (1927) C. 1-8; 3 PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN 
THOUGHT (1930) 1-287; BUCK, THE GRANGER MOVEMENT (1913) and THE 
AGRARIAN CRUSADE (1920); THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS (1918) c. 14- 
20; SEITZ, THE DREADFUL DECADE (1926); LYNCH, "BOSS" TWEED (1927); 
WOODWARD, MEET GENERAL GRANT (1928); DAVIS, THE UNION PACIFIC 
RAILWAY (1894); DUNNING, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES FROM 
ROUSSEAU TO SPENCER (1920); GIDE AND RIST, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC 
DOCTRINES (1925); MITCHELL, BUSINESS CYCLES (1927); LIPPINCOTT, ECO- 
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1921) pt. 4; BOGART, ECO- 
NOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1923). 
The following statistics are condensed from BOGART (B.) and LIPPINCOTT 
(L.), op. cit. supra: 
1860 1870 1880 
Coal (B. 319) ............ 14 mil. tons 71 mil. tons 
Pig iron (L. 443) ....... 821,000 " 3,385,000 
" 
Cotton goods (L. 451).... $115,000,000 $192,000,000 
Woolens (L. 451) ........ 73,000,000 238,000,000 
Farm Machinery (L. 449). 21,000,000 $52,000,000 68,000,000 
Population (L. 311) ..... 31,000,000 40,000,000 50,000,000 
Wage earners in factories. 1,300,000 (L. 312) 2,700,000 (B. 382) 
Railway mileage (B. 332). 30,000 52,000 93,000 
Except temporarily in the beginning of new industries, increase in 
the 
volume and value of manufactures concurred with a steady diminution in 
the number of establishments (B. 386-7). 
"Wage earners in factories" in the above table include only a 
limited 
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and human. If "men of vision" built for the future, it was not 
for the sake of the future. Railways were built to be "milked" 
by their promoters of subsidies obtained through legislative 
corruption. Many railroads, to finance which middle western 
pioneers mortgaged their farms 5 or issued municipal bonds,6 
were not built at all. In boom times nothing but expansion 
seemed important. Before production exceeded the buying power 
of old markets, new markets were planted by new railways on 
the prairies. Alternate links of transportation and industry com- 
posed an ever-lengthening endless chain which, primed with 
immigrants,7 pumped wealth--enriching life in some respects, 
impoverishing it in others.8 The boom was prolonged by ab- 
normal European demand for American food stuffs due to wars 
and crop shortages.9 While this accident obscured the hard 
class of industrial wage earners; miners, for example, are excluded. Nor 
do they include dependents. In 1880, however, 70% of the population was 
still rural (L. 313). 
5 See e. g., Sawyer v. Prickett, 19 Wall. 146 (U. S. 1873). It seems to 
have been part of the technique of promotion to pass bonds or mortgages 
issued for railway stock through the hands of someone who could qualify 
as a bona fide purchaser for value. 
6 A vivid impression of the extent and results of this practice may be had 
by an examination, almost at random, of the cases in Wallace's United 
States Reports indexed under "Municipal Bonds." 
7 In 1873 immigration was 460,000; in 1879, 789,000. From 1861 to 
1870 the total was 2,300,000; from 1871 to 1880, 2,800,000. About nine 
tenths were from northern Europe. Immigration was accelerated by the 
act of 1864 "to encourage immigration," which authorized the importation 
of contract labor-a practice which the repeal of that act in 1868 did not 
end. LIPPENCOTT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 314-318. 
8 There was loss, in particular, in values served by homogeneity of popu- 
lation-which include morality, obligations of mutual service (MALINOW- 
SKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926)), the security of a 
settled order, and, perhaps, a greater generality of warmth in personal 
relations-at least a comparative absence of friction-than exists when 
individual conduct is less under the eye of the community and "success" 
less dependent upon esteem. American life before the Civil War was un- 
doubtedly narrow and provincial-often sordid. See, e. g., DICKENS, MAR- 
TIN CHUZZLEWIT; WERNER, BARNUM (1923). Its self-satisfaction seemed 
absurd, to observers with larger horizons; it was, however, satisfaction. 
And there was much of the justification for self-satisfaction that there 
is in primitive society. If an homogeneous folk does not tolerate even fruit- 
ful variations from its norms, neither does it tolerate large criminal and 
predatory classes. Compare in this respect contemporary England, which 
is comparatively homogeneous, with the United States. Compare also the 
earlier New England with the New England of abandoned farms surround- 
ing tuberculous mill-towns. And note the extent to which the agricultural 
Middle West, which approaches homogeneity, has become the seat of politi- 
cal morality. 
9 In 1870 and 1871 exports of flour to Europe were more than a third 
greater than in the years immediately proceding. In 1872 they fell sharply 
back again. See table in the Introduction to the translation by De Courcy 
Thom of JUGLAR, BRIEF HISTORY OF PANICS (1893). 
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truth that new farmers along the lines of new railways were 
producing more wheat, corn, hogs and cattle than normal markets 
could buy, it seemed that the middle west could not be developed 
too fast for its own good, that no railway building was over- 
building. But peace and comparative plenty returned to Europe, 
and after the resultant Panic of 1873 1 people at large paid 
heavily for the creation and concentration of great wealth. The 
depression lasted until 1879. Prices fell to unprecedented depths. 
Farm and railway mortgages were foreclosed. Small indepen- 
dent business men and manufacturers closed their establishments 
forever and took salaried jobs-if they could get them.'l The 
tramp, in thousands, appeared for the first time in America. 
"It is with a sort of angry surprise," wrote Charles F. Dunbar 
in the Centenniel volume of the North American Review, "that 
our people note their increasing sensitiveness to the penalties 
with which economic error is visited." 12 Men who, according to 
Woodrow Wilson, "did not know how to reason upon such 
matters" attributed calamity to the demonitization of silver, and 
advocated unlimited fiat money as a remedy.13 Undoubtedly 
they reasoned badly. But were there many who reasoned much 
better? Theirs were not the only special interests that warped 
judgment. And fixed prepossessions clouded or blocked the 
thinking of even the most disinterested. 
10 "In September, 1873, financial panic once more came upon the country 
with a rush, amidst abundant trade, amidst every sign of prosperity, when 
wages were good, employment readily found, factories busy, prices normal, 
money easy. Railways had been built too fast in the West.... Such roads 
could not reasonably look to make a profit for twenty years to come... 
Their construction was for the present purely speculative, and the processes 
of growth upon which they depended to keep them from bankruptcy could 
not be sufficiently hurried to save their credit. Early in September, 1873, 
the break began to come. One by one banking and brokerage firms in New 
York which had advanced money to western and Canadian railways began 
to announce their inability to meet their obligations. ... A long, slow win- 
ter of panic ensued whose effects the business of the country was to feel 
for years to come." WILSON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 92, 93. 
11 The smaller and more old-fashioned the business, the less its chance 
of weathering the depression. Both the speed and the hardships of the 
process of industrial concentration were augmented. 
12 (1876) 122 N. AM. REV. 124, 152. 
13 WILSON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 93, 154; BUCK, op. cit. supra note 4. 
Most of the votes for the Greenback ticket in 1876 and 1878 were cast by 
farmers who objected to re-paying loans made to them in depreciated Civil 
War greenbacks with more valuable gold. Any satisfaction obtained from 
the final result of the Legal Tender cases was mitigated by the success of 
the fiscal policy designed to bring greenbacks to par. The demand was 
mainly for abundant cheap currency. The political movement showed 
only traces of the theory of its first prophet- that the government should 
become the universal banker, so that those unable to get credit at private 
banks might compete on equal terms with the more fortunate. KELLOGG, 
LABOR AND OTHER CAPITAL (1849). 
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These prepossessions were of the rightness and inexorability 
of certain economic and political dogmas which had permeated 
society by way of Adam Smith and Thomas Jefferson. In- 
dividual liberty is an inalienable right, "natural" and therefore 
sacred. The welfare of all is served by the freedom of each 
to do his utmost to better his own condition. The "natural" 
correctives of hardship in the anarchic scramble of a free society 
are the equilibrium of supply and demand, competition, and the 
moral sentiments which arise from mutual "sympathy." Gov- 
ernment, though its necessity was inconsistently conceded, is an 
evil, and therefore to be kept at a minimum; governmental inter- 
ference diminishes rather the blessings than the cruelties of 
natural anarchy. Hamiltonian practicality was not, to be sure, 
deterred by such principles from obtaining from government 
special benefits and privileges. But after Jacksonian democracy 
had made Hamiltonian candor impossible in public, practicality 
became adept in drawing defensive arguments from the reservoir 
of the "natural rights" of individuals and the "natural laws" 
of economics, shifting when occasion required to the Benthamite 
arguments of social utility which are impartially available to all 
comers.14 Certain awkward truths had indeed been noted by 
Sismondi in 1819: that under the "natural laws" upon which, 
without pretending that they are adequate for protection against 
crime, we inconsistently rely for economic welfare, the equilib- 
rium of supply and demand, though always a tendency, is never 
a fact; that "natural" adjustments of supply to demand do not 
precede or prevent crises of over-production, and are devastating 
in their subsequent operation; that the doctrine of the bene- 
ficience of free competition is premised upon the approximate 
equality of competitors; the premise being false, the equal free- 
dom of all to promote competitively their respective interests 
results in fact in the enforced acceptance by most people of 
evils preferable only to the evil of extinction.15 But Sismondi, 
in this country, was only a name, if that. The place for Utopian 
dreamers was at Brook Farm or Walden Woods.16 With "prac- 
14 For Adam Smith see GIDE AND RIST, op. sit. supra note 4, bk. 1, c. 2, 
and STEPHEN, ENGLISH THOUGHT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1876) 
c. 9 and 11; for Jefferson and Hamilton, 1 PARRINGTON, op. cit. supra note 
4, at 267-356; for Bentham, DICEY, LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND (1905) 
Lect. 6, and DUNNING, Op. cit. supra note 4, at c. 6. 
15 For Sismondi, see GIDE and RIST, op. cit. supra note 4, at bk. 2, c. 1, 
and MAO-LAN TUAN, SIMONDE DE SISMONDI AS AN ECONOMIST (1927); his 
economic writings seem still to be represented in English only by a collec- 
tion of extracts-POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF GOVERN- 
MENT (1847). That Adam Smith held, though he did not emphasize, views 
similar to Sismondi's is suggested by passages in the WEALTH OF NATIONS 
(1776) bk. 2, c. 2; bk. 5, c. 1, pt. 3, art. 1; (ed. Dent 1910) i, 289, ii, 228 
et seq. 
16 For early Utopianism in the United States see 1 COMMONS, HISTORY 
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tical" men demonstration of the impracticality of Utopian pro- 
posals passed as equivalent to vindication of their faith that the 
equal liberty of unequal individuals is ordained by God or nature, 
and that for the hardships which inevitably result from the 
equal freedom of the strong and weak no relief is possible save 
such as proceeds spontaneously from the "sympathy" of man 
with man. And in the middle of the century, when John Stuart 
Mill was himself struggling to escape from the inexorability 
of the "natural laws" for which he stood popularly as a 
prophet,l7 the phrase "survival of the fittest" contributed a new 
ethical prop to individualist dogma. 
In this state of the currency of common thought, any recogni- 
tion of economic anarchy as the economic error for which the 
depression of the seventies was a visitation was usually neu- 
tralized by the presumption that anarchy (the word used, of 
course, was "liberty") is ideal. The intellectual cloture of a 
superficially libertarian orthodoxy conditioned the expression 
and to an extent limited the thinking of even the most acute 
social diagnosticians-of whom the members of the third gen- 
eration from John Adams were surely not far from foremost. 
In "A Chapter of Erie" Charles Francis Adams not only con- 
demned financial "buccaneers" in terms of the morality upon 
which individualism relied for social control, but undertook also 
to disclose the roots of "the deep decay which has eaten into 
our social edifice." 18 He was, however, diffident as to remedy. 
His chief hope, not very confident, was in the "moral vigor" 
of the American people. He agreed with E. Lawrence God- 
kin, the first editor of the Nation, that government inter- 
ference with private enterprise19 is justified only when "one 
branch of business is so monopolized that citizens can no longer 
share in or control it, and so mismanaged that they can no longer 
OF LABOUR (1918) 14, 493 et seq.; 2 PARRINGTON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 
242, 251-253, 342-50, 400 ct seq. 
17 See GIDE and RIST, op. cit. supra note 4, at bk. 3, c. 2. 
18 "Modern society," he said, "has created a class of artificial beings 
who bid fair soon to be the masters of their creator." Indications seemed 
to him to point to an ultimate combination in one vigorous hand of cor- 
porate economic power with political power obtained through corruption 
of popular government-which, when accomplished, will "bring our vaunted 
institutions within the rule of all historic precedent." This essay was 
first published in (1869) 109 N. AM. REV. 30; reprinted in IICKS, 
HIGH 
FINANCE IN THE SIXTIES (1930) q. v. at 114-119. 
19 Historically the conception of corporate enterprise as private enter- 
prise is anomalous. See The Dartmouth College Case (1874) 8 AM. L. 
REV. 
189, 212, 216-221, 226. This unsigned article was perhaps written by Moor- 
field Storey, who was an editor of the magazine. It was not until after 
the Dartmouth College Case that the paradoxical phrase "private corpo- 
ration" became commonplace. 
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endure it." 20 Nearly everyone who mattered shrank from any 
approach to government interference with business,21 either on 
grounds of dogmatic individualism or because he had no answer 
to the hard-headed Hamiltonianism of such as Mr. W. M. Gros- 
venor: 
"Does any man seriously believe that 4,000 millions of prop- 
erty, with revenues of 500 million yearly, in the hands of men 
who already make and unmake Senators and Representatives in 
many states, can be controlled by a free government? It would be 
simpler to elect Colonel Scott perpetual President of the United 
States with powers of dictator. If ever the United States makes 
it necessary for railway property and railway managers either 
to control the government or be controlled by it, the end is 
sure.... We shall escape Communism... because we shall surely 
take Despotism as better." 22 
Nevertheless, confronted with actualities of anarchic oppres- 
sion-notably arbitrary charges on the "all the traffic will bear" 
principle in territory where cut-throat competition did not force 
charges preposterously low-laissez-faire individualism, in spite 
of itself and without quite knowing what it was about, yielded 
ground. The Granger legislation was passed and sustained.23 
It could be said in an opinion of the Supreme Court that, "A 
railroad is authorized to be constructed more for the public good 
to be subserved, than for private gain.... its construction and 
management belong primarily to the Commonwealth, and are 
20 In a report as Railroad Commissioner of Massachusetts, Feb. 14, 1873, 
urging "the regulation of all railroads through state ownership of one." 
Pamphlet, N. Y. Public Library, TPG pv 68 No. 9. Adams agreed that at 
the foundation of republican institutions is "the great principle of not un- 
necessarily meddling." ADAMS, RAILROADS, THEIR ORIGIN AND PROBLEMS 
(1878) 212-213. Adams, however, was comparatively free from the dog- 
matic individualism of Godkin and almost all other leaders of opinion. 
His position was based as much on a realization that government interfer- 
ence was unobtainable as that it was undesirable. "The statesman, no 
matter how sagacious he may be, can but build with the materials he finds 
ready for his hand. ... If he is to succeed, he must have the conditions 
necessary to success." Ibid. 146. 
21 Goldwin Smith, then a professor at Cornell, was a conspicuous excep- tion. See his article, The Labour War in the United States, 30 CONTEM- 
PORARY REVIEW (London, 1877) 529, 538. The Greenbackers fulminated 
vaguely against corporations in terms later taken over by the major par- ties. SHIPPEE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 86. European Socialism, though there were immigrants who preached it, was as yet scarcely audible. 2 
COMMONS, HISTORY OF LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES (1918) 203-234. 
22 The Communist and the Railway (Sept. 1877) INTERNATIONAL REV. 
585, 598-9. To the same effect is Richard S. Spofford's reply to Charles 
Francis Adams' proposal in the Massachusetts legislature. Pamphlet, N. Y. 
Public Library, TPG pv 105. 
23 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1928) c. 33. 
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only put in private hands to subserve the public convenience and 
economy." 24 Railroads continued, however, to be dealt with as 
private property, no matter how conspicuous the failure of pri- 
vate operation to subserve public convenience and economy; 
25 
and only "men who did not know how to reason" advocated a 
reversal of this policy. 
Baffled by his own convictions as well as by practical diffi- 
culties in his approach to the problems of economic anarchy, the 
individualist tended to focus attention upon its incident of politi- 
cal corruption. Callousness to corruption was considerable. 
"When you have proved to the busy wealth seeker," said Samuel 
Bowles in the Springfield Republican, "that the President has 
shown an indecent fondness for gifts, that he has appointed ras- 
cally or incapable kinsmen to office, that he has cracked, if not 
broken, the laws, what have you accomplished by your denuncia- 
tion? They [sic] will reply to you, 'General Grant is a safe 
man.'" 26 Callousness in boom times was not, however, more 
dense then than since. And economic depression revealed that 
at bottom we were a moral people, who went to church on Sun- 
days and to lectures during the week. The moralist looked at 
corruption less as a result of conditions than as wanton sin. And 
sinners, if they could not be saved, could at least be condemned 
and cast out into darkness. This attitude permeated the advo- 
cacies of the most intelligent "reformers" of the time-Adams, 
Godkin, Carl Schurz, George William Curtis. It is hard indeed 
to collect from Godkin's writings-always powerful, often pene- 
trating-any principle more profound than that the Goulds, 
Fiskes, Grants, Blaines and Tweeds should be superseded in high 
places by great gentlemen like his friends Charles Eliot 
Norton 
and James Russell Lowell.7 Men of such feelings were offended 
a decade later by what seemed to them the cynicism of Henry 
George: "'Let us elect good men to office,' say the quacks. Yes; 
24 Woods, J., in Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126, 135 (1881). 
25 There was no public interest which a court could recognize 
in prevent- 
ing or redressing the spoliation of the Union Pacific by its directors. 
United States v. Union Pacific Ry., 98 U. S. 569 (1878). The spoliation 
was, however, clearly unlawful as against a private interest. Wardell 
v. 
Union Pacific Ry., 103 U. S. 651 (1880). Was the spoliative character 
of the Credit Mobilier adventure affected by the fact, if it was a fact, 
that the adventurers failed to profit? See LAUT, THE RONMANCE OF 
THE 
RAILS (1929) 318-336. 
26 2 MERRIAM, LIFE AND TIMES OF SAMUEL BOWLES (1885) 195-6. Cf. 
THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS (1918) c. 17 and 18; Senator Hoar's 
speech on the Belknap impeachment (1876), quoted 
in PECk, TWENTY 
YEARS OF TIIE REPUBLIC (1905) 316. 
27 See OGDEN, LIFE AND LETTERS OF E. LAWRENCE GODKIN (1907). 
Godkin 
is well described as "the founder of adult journalism in America." He 
was 
not, however, an American. And he was not a realist, See 
PARRINGTON, 
op. cit. supra note 4, at 154-168. 
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let us catch little birds by sprinkling salt on their tails !" 28 In 
the depression of the seventies, as often since, their prescription 
of public virtue was the only reform on which any appreciable 
constituency could agree. The nomination and dubious election 
of Hayes, the goodest man who ever became President, was its 
victory. 
II 
It was during the administration of Hayes that the unregulated 
private operation of railways, the effects of its anarchy intensi- 
fied by the depression, produced the strike which a good many 
contemporary binoculars magnified, for the moment, to the pro- 
portions of a social revolution. 
During the depression the primary object of every owner of a 
business was to survive. Present profit, if possible at all,29 was 
secondary. The immediate aims were to keep one's apparatus 
for future profit in working order, and not to part with its owner- 
ship or control. The owners of many Middle Western railways, 
unable to meet fixed charges, had to call on the courts to take 
care of their properties through receivers; some were, others 
were not, able to profit by the receivership and reorganization 
proceedings and find themselves still in the drivers' seats at their 
conclusion. Of the lines between New York and Chicago, already 
combined into four great competing systems, only the pilfered 
Erie had recourse to receivership. But in the struggle to sur- 
vive even the New York Central and the Pennsylvania cut 
viciously at one another's throats. In 1876 Mr. James Ford 
Rhodes bought a ticket from Cleveland to Boston for $6.80. Cat- 
tle were carried from Chicago to New York at a dollar a car- 
load.30 
Losses on competitive through traffic were in part recouped 
by exorbitant rates from way stations such as Pittsburgh. Rail- 
way employees also were naturally required to contribute to the 
costs of cutthroat competition. Reductions of wages were not 
28 GEORGE, SOCIAL PROBLEMS (1883) 16. 
29 In many businesses approach to monopoly was a condition not alone 
of profit but survival. HADLEY, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION (1885) c. 4 and 
5. The most practical remedy for cutthroat competition was through pool- 
ing agreements-potentially a means towards comparative economic order, 
but often in practice a means of extortion. See Morris Run Coal Co. v. 
Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 (1871). Pools were often short-lived for 
the reason that parties could not be brought to see that honest observance 
of their terms was the best policy. RHODES, op. cit. supra note 4, at 16. 
"Lawlessness and violence among themselves . . .bred . . . distrust, bad 
faith and cunning, until railroad officials have become hardly better than 
a race of horse jockeys on a large scale." ADAMS, op. cit. supra note 20, at 
193. 
30 RHODES, op. cit. supra note 4, at 15-17. 
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negotiated in those days; they were announced.31 There had been 
successive reductions since the Panic. Many of the men, more- 
over, were on part time and subject to onerous boarding house 
charges at the end of runs which left them far from home. And 
upon a truce in the rate war effective July 1, 1877, came an- 
nouncement of a further ten per cent cut in wages.32 
There was never a strike less organized and more spontaneous 
than that which followed. The British charge d'affaires con- 
jectured that but for some panicky firing into an unarmed crowd 
by frightened militiamen at Baltimore on July 20th, it would 
have remained local to the Baltimore and Ohio.33 It spread "more 
by contagion than by organization." 34 Some Brotherhood offi- 
cers may have been active, but not officially.35 The Engineers, 
strongest of the Brotherhoods, had been a few months earlier, in 
Godkin's phrase, "collared and subdued." 36 An attempted secret 
"Trainmen's Union" had fizzled a few weeks earlier.37 Casual 
local leaderships there inevitably were, but no policy or direction 
31 Some testimony of A. J. Cassatt, then vice president of the Pennsyl- 
vania, Railroad, illustrates the feeling of the period of individualism as 
to the "rights" of employers. One of the economies put into effect by the 
Pennsylvania was the running of "double-headers;" two freight trains were 
combined into one, halving the crew except on its two locomotives. Train- 
men protested against resulting lay-offs and part time. Mr. Cassatt might 
have based his answer upon economics. But he said instead: "We looked 
upon the objection of the men as an interference with our own business." 
5 PA. LEG. Doc. (Session of 1878), REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED 
TO INVESTIGATE THE RAILROAD RIOTS, 698. 
32 2 COMMONS, op. cit. supra note 21, at 185. 
33 GREAT BRITAIN, FOREIGN OFFICE, COMMERCIAL REPORTS (1877) Vol. 84, 
No. 22, REPORTS RESPECTING THE LATE INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, Report No. 1. Most of the reports in this collection are 
by Mr. F. R. Plunkett charge d'affaires, to the Earl of Derby. 
34 Smith, op. cit. supra note 21. 
35 BRITISH REPORTS, Op. cit. supra note 33, Report No. 5. 
36NATION (Mar. 8, 1888). Cf. 2 COMMONS, op. cit. supra note 21, at 
61-65, 186. The railway Brotherhoods were then little more than fraternal 
benefit societies. The Engineers had organized in 1863 to resist the sub- 
stitution of the run for the time basis of pay; but they had almost at 
once, with occasional inconsistencies, limited their objectives to the develop- 
ment of an efficiency and a moral character which would win the grateful 
appreciation of employers. P. M. Arthur had been elected grand chief as 
an insurgent against this policy. In strikes on the Boston and Maine and 
the Grand Trunk in the winter of 1876-7 he had made the cruel and colossal 
blunder of directing the engineers to leave passenger trains between sta- 
tions, without notice or warning, in a northern blizzard. 
37 2 COMMONS, op. cit. supra note 21, at 186. The chief organizer of this 
disrupted union, a young brakeman named Ammon, assumed local direction 
of the strikers at Alleghany, Pennsylvania, efficiently preventing any dis- 
order or destruction of property. Instead of tying up the lines radiating 
from Alleghany, Ammon and his men took them over and operated them- 
a phenomenon perhaps more terrifying than the Pittsburgh Riots. PA. 
LEG. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 31, at 21-22. 
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more definite than could spring from the concurring wills of an 
indignant mass.38 
Colonel Thomas A. Scott, president of the Pennsylvania Rail- 
road, wrote about the strike in the North American Review soon 
after it was over.39 His analysis of causes and motives is inter- 
ested and inadequate. But his outline of events is succinct and 
sufficient: 
"On the 16th of July it became known that the firemen and 
freight brakemen of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad were on 
a strike at Martinsburg, West Virginia, and that no freight 
trains were allowed to pass that point in either direction. This 
proved to be the beginning of a movement which spread with 
great rapidity from New York to Kansas and from Michigan to 
Texas, which placed an embargo on the entire freight traffic of 
more than twenty thousand miles of railway, put passenger 
travel and the movement of the United States mails at the mercy 
of a mob, subjected great commercial centers like Chicago and 
38 Professional exploiters of sensational episodes of the strike freely, but 
without specification or adduction of evidence, attributed leadership to 
Socialist immigrants. PINKERTON, STRIKERS, COMMUNISTS, TRAMPS AND 
DETECTIVES (1878); MCCABE (Edward W. Martin, pseud.), THE HISTORY 
OF THE GREAT RIOTS (1877). A British consular officer said that the for- 
mation of secret societies which blindly follow the edicts of one master 
mind "appears to be universal among all the working people of this coun- 
try." BRITISII REPORTS, op. cit. supra note 33, No. 2. Such statements 
were based rather upon will to believe than information. The British 
charge was more temperate: "There is no doubt," he said, "that a very 
considerable number of rioters were Europeans, and that for much of what 
has happened the lessons learnt from the Socialist leaders in the old world 
have to bear a large share of the blame." BRITISH REPORTS, op. cit. suzpra 
note 33, Final Report (Oct. 9). Even this may impute to Socialist immi- 
grants more influence than they had. Unquestionably, doctrinaire radicals 
endeavored to make capital from the disorders and were doubtless often 
willing to take credit for them. See So THE RAILROAD KINGS ITCH FOR AN 
EMPIRE, DO THEY?, BY A RED HOT STRIKER (Sidney H. Morse) OF SCRANTON 
(1877), pamph. N. Y. Public Library, TDG pv 9; HEYWOOD, THE GREAT 
STRIKE; "Its relations to labor, property and government; Suggested by the 
movements which, originating in the tyrannous extortion of railroad mas- 
ters, and the execution of eleven labor reformers called "Mollie Maguires" 
June 21, 1877, culminated in burning the corporate property in Pittsburgh. 
. . . This essay carefully defines the relative claims of WORK and 
WEALTH involved in the IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT between Capital 
and Labor" (1878), pamph. N. Y. Public Library, TDB pv 29 No. 9. 
Socialists were then usually Germans. Railway employees were for 
the most part either native born or Irish. The constitution of the mobs 
of course defies analysis. But Socialist meetings during the strike, though 
important to the newspapers, fizzled. See BRITISH REPORTS, op. cit. supra 
note 33. Irish immigrant labor had lately shown an aptitude for violence 
on undoctrinaire principles in the Pennsylvania coal fields. RHODES, op. 
cit supra note 4, at c. 2, The Mollie Maguires; 2 COMMONS, op. cit. supra 
note 21, at 181-5. And there is considerable historical evidence of capacity 
for mob violence in our native stock. 
39 Scott, The Recent Strikes (1877) 125 No. AM. REV. 351. 
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St. Louis to the violent disturbance of their business relations, 
and made the great manufacturing city of Pittsburgh for twenty- 
four hours such a scene of riot, arson, and bloodshed as can never 
be erased from the memory of its inhabitants." 
The strike mobs were composed of the miscellaneous unem- 
ployed; the proportion of striking railway employees is unascer- 
tainable but was probably minor.40 The incidents of riot, arson, 
and bloodshed, though appalling, were exceptional.41 The usual 
mob procedure was to block tracks, yards and stations, and pre- 
vent the movement of trains. In general, the strikers "did every- 
thing they could to keep up the regular running of all trains 
carrying the United States mails" in proof that they were fight- 
ing the corporations only.42 Troops, Federal and state (the civil 
authorities did little or nothing), soon broke up the mobs and 
"moved the trains." Within a fortnight the strike was over. 
III 
It is striking, though not at all extraordinary, that there were 
few, if any, prosecutions in state courts 43 for participation in 
any of the thousands of crimes incident to that fortnight of dis- 
order. The state of public opinion accounts for this suspension 
of the criminal law. "The system of corporate life and corporate 
power" was still in its infancy. The majority of the population 
was still dependent upon agriculture. The units of commerce and 
industry were still, for the most part, small. The local mine 
owner, the small shopkeeper, the contracting carpenter, had the 
dignity of independence. Their voices dominated public opinion. 
However crudely the ordinary citizen thought and talked about 
public affairs, he did think and talk about them, with a proud 
sense that his opinion was worth something. Democracy was 
operative. 
The ordinary man hated and feared the railroads, not alone 
for their discriminations, extortions and frauds, but also because 
they symbolized for him the "Big Business" that was commenc- 
40 When after the strike the railway employees were back at their jobs 
and anxious to hold them, their orthodox explanation was that they had 
not struck at all but had been coerced by mobs to leave their trains. It 
seems clear, however, that most of them wanted to be coerced and adopted 
slight demonstrations as pretexts for quitting. PA. LEG. REPORT, op. cit. 
supra note 31, at 5-6, 439, 579. 
41 At Pittsburgh a regiment of militia was besieged in a houndhouse 
and burned out, with loss of life. 2 COMMONS, op. cit. supra note 21, at 
185-191; RHODES, op. cit. supra note 4, at 17-51. There was also violence 
and destruction of railway property at Chicago and St. Louis. 
42 BRITISH REPORTS, op. cit. supra note 33, Report No. 3. 
43 There was a conviction in a federal court for obstructing the mails, 
on a theory which becamre important in the railway strike of 1894. United 
States v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 443 (E. D. Pa. 1877). 
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ing to impinge on many sides. The newspapers were small and 
still his. Politicians and office holders, though they might sec- 
retly be for sale, had assiduously to cultivate the conviction that 
they also were his. Wage earners, unless they were unassimilated 
alien immigrants, seemed potential allies of the farmers and 
small business men in the coming struggle for independence. 
In 1876 Senator Carpenter of Wisconsin and Ben Butler of Mass- 
achusetts defended, without fee, coal miners prosecuted in Penn- 
sylvania for conspiracy to prevent the employment of strike 
breakers.44 Even violence in strikes, if it did not touch too 
nearly the ordinary man's own peace and property, was con- 
doned. Major William McKinley of Canton, Ohio, won his first 
election to Congress by his eloquent defense, as volunteer counsel, 
of certain striking miners for riotous assault upon a member of 
Mark Hanna's firm of Rhodes Brothers 45 who was personally 
conducting to his mine a party of strike-breakers. "In his 
address to the jury he drew a picture of the scene of the riot 
which drew tears from eyes unused to weeping. He depicted 
the miners confronted with the sight of the men come to take 
away the work which fed their wives and little children. The 
miners, exclaimed the young attorney, became insane, and did 
not know what they were doing; they were not responsible for 
their acts, and he demanded an acquittal of the accused." 46 
44Commonwealth v. Siney and Parks, ROY, HISTORY OF THE COAL 
MINERS (1906) 176. Siney was the first American labor leader to achieve 
for a large constituency anything like solidity of organization. The labor 
movement of the period otherwise consisted largely of groups of oratorical 
"reformers" speaking (sometimes with considerable effect upon legislation) 
for the virtually unorganized constituency of wage earners in general. 
WARE, THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1860-1895 (1929) 
11; 2 COMMONS, op. cit. supra note 21, at 179-180. Siney was clear-headed, 
temperate and law-abiding. He had opposed as inexpedient the strike in 
Clearfield County, Pa., in 1876; it was whipped up notwithstanding by 
local agitators such as Parks-who threatened, for.example, to send im- 
ported strike-breakers out of Clearfield "in wooden overcoats." Siney ex- 
erted himself to keep the strikers within bounds. The prosecution seems 
to have been a deliberate attempt on the part of the operators to catch 
in the loose net of "conspiracy" not only the abortive indiscretion of Parks 
but also the vastly more formidable moderation of Siney. 
45 Hanna was present at the trial, which may have been the occasion of 
his first meeting with McKinley. He was never again, as an employer, 
subjected to serious labor trouble. He maintained throughout his business 
career relations of personal friendliness with his thousands of employees, 
and in public life exerted himself on behalf of industrial peace. CROLY, 
MARCUS ALONZO HANNA (1912) 94, 386-410. 
46 ROY, op. cit. supra note 44, at 173. 
The case is not mentioned in McKinley's official biography-which, how- 
ever, quotes as follows from a panegyric by Justice William R. Day: "In 
the trial of a case Major McKinley gained the confidence of the jury by 
the fairness and courtesy of his conduct, and into all his arguments was 
thrown the silent but potent influence of a character beyond reproach .... 
519 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.224 on Sat, 15 Jun 2013 19:59:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
YALE LAW JOURNAL 
The ears to the ground of this rising young lawyer usually caught 
pretty accurately the ground's pulsations. They were strongly 
anti-capitalist in 1877 when the local militia at Pittsburgh 
fraternized with the strike mob.47 In many parts of the country 
it would have been a foolhardy chief of police who interfered 
with the mobs and a still more foolhardy district attorney who 
asked a grand jury to indict their members. 
Yet sober men in responsible positions could not rest quiescent 
in the face of anarchy manifest. Though Colonel Scott's impor- 
tunity for soldiers seemed ridiculous to a respectable editor,48 
when governors applied for soldiers President Hayes of course 
proclaimed a constitutional occasion and furnished them.49 The 
notion that the Federal government might file bills in equity and 
obtain injunctions against unlawful interference with railways, 
as was done in 1894, would, had anyone even thought of it, have 
seemed preposterous.5° But it is possible to infer that Attorney 
General Devens may have instigated-he certainly supported- 
the extraordinary activities of Federal courts "in their admin- 
istrative capacity" presently to be described.51 Many railways 
in the Seventh Circuit (Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin) were 
in the hands of receivers appointed to operate them pending suits 
to foreclose mortgages. Thomas Drummond was Circuit Judge.'5 
He had the faculty of putting things so that the jury could readily com- 
prehend and follow his arguments. He spoke to them as he has since 
spoken to the people, appealing to their judgment and understanding, rather 
than to passion or prejudice." OLCOTT, WILLIAM MCKINLEY (1916) 61. 
47 It was a regiment from Philadelphia that was besieged in the Pitts- 
burgh roundhouse. The city and county authorities at Pittsburgh as 
well as the militia were in sympathy with the strike. Newspapers described 
the "uncalled for blood-shed" as fruit of the governor's hasty step in 
calling out the militia. "Capital," said the Pittsburgh Critic, "has raised 
itself on the ruins of labor." The battle at the roundhouse, according to 
the Pittsburgh Globe, was the "Lexington of the labor conflict." PA. LEG. 
REPORT, op. cit. supra note 31, at 14-15, 37, 184 et seq., 256, 288, 388-392, 
514, 620, 667-670, 798-819. 
48 BRITISH REPORTS, op. cit. supra, note 33, No. 5 
49 7 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS (1896-99) 447 
(proclamations), 472 (Message, Dec. 3, 1877). 
50 See 1 GRESHAM, LIFE OF WALTER Q. GRESHAM (1919) 393. 
5 Ibid. 384, 398, where his telegrams are quoted. 
52 Thomas Drummond (1809-1890) seems to have merited the affection and 
the respect with which he was regarded. He was of the school and time 
of Lincoln, David Davis, Sidney Breese and Lyman Trumbali-"a simple, 
honest, straightforward, true-hearted man" whose public and private 
character "illustrated all the old-fashioned virtues." His appointment as 
District Judge for Illinois was by President Taylor in 1850; his promotion 
to Circuit Judge, by Grant in 1869. During the Civil War, in spite of 
his intense Union patriotism, he enjoined General Burnside's suppression 
of the Chicago Times. He played an important part in the expansion of 
Federal equity jurisdiction, deciding cases on what seemed to him sound 
principles-as they usually were, save perhaps for their tendency to mag- 
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Walter Q. Gresham was District Judge in Indiana.8 
Full details of what Judge Gresham did in Indiana are pre- 
served in his valuable biography. When the strike mob occupied 
the station at Indianapolis, Gresham held in his court room a 
mass-meeting of prominent citizens, most of whom had served 
in the Civil War. He said "that the community was in posses- 
sion of the mob; that the governor, the mayor, and the sheriff, 
whose duty it was to act, were supine; life and property were in 
nify Federal judicial power-without fencing with precedents, writing short 
opinions, or sometimes none. He was influential, under pressure from 
Gresham, in establishing the "tin bucket" priority in receiverships, over- 
ruling in Turner v. I. B. & W. R. R., 8 Biss. 315 (1878), his own earlier 
view, expressed in Denniston v. Chicago, Alton & St. Louis R.R., 4 Biss. 414 
(1864), that "a railroad mortgage is the same as a mortgage on a farm 
or a house." His was the first opinion sustaining Granger legislation. 
Peik v. Chicago & North Western Ry., 6 Biss. 177 (1874), aff'd, 94 U. S. 
165 (1876). His biographer likens him to Lord Camden-with the qualifi- 
cation that he did not "altogether share that great man's just appreciation 
of the vital importance of jury trial to free institutions." Sketch by 
S. S. Gregory in 5 LEWIS, GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS (1908) 503. See 
also GRESHAM, op. cit. supra note 50, at c. 22. 
53 Walter Quentin Gresham (1832-1895) was concerned from boyhood 
with law and politics in the often turbulent conditions of the Indiana- 
Kentucky border. He served in the Union army throughout the Civil 
War, commanding a division at the end, and was appointed District Judge 
by President Grant in 1869. After serving as Postmaster General under 
President Arthur, he succeeded Judge Drummond as Circuit Judge for the 
Seventh Circuit in 1884. On the bench he was at once vigorous and 
humane. His conception of equity as justice sometimes failed to meet 
approval from the Supreme Court. His most celebrated judicial utterance 
was: "Jay Gould can't run this court." For the circumstances, see his 
biography, op. cit. supra note 50, at 553-4. At the suit of bondholders 
complaining of inequitable subordination of their liens to Gould-Sage in- 
terests in the Wabash reorganization in the Eighth Circuit, he removed 
the receivers of the Wabash lines east of the Mississippi (who had been 
appointed by comity, having first been appointed by Judge Brewer at 
St. Louis for the lines west), appointing Judge Cooley in their stead, and 
impliedly condemning Judge Brewer's conduct of the receivership. Atkins 
v. Wabash Ry., 29 Fed. 161 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1886). 
In the dead-locked Republican Convention of 1888 he was a leading 
candidate; his wife believes that he would have been nominated had he 
been willing to respond to overtures of Platt and Quay. In 1892, dis- 
gusted with both persons and principles dominant in the Republican Party, 
he supported Cleveland, who appointed him Secretary of State. The 
phrase "shirt-sleeve diplomacy" was coined during his incumbancy of 
that office. He staved off for one term the annexation of Hawaii, hoping 
that the government of the islands could be restored to the natives from 
whom American adventurers had taken it. At the time of his death he 
was drafting a state paper on the Venezuela controversy, which Mrs. 
Gresham says would not have contained the celebrated ultimatum to Eng- 
land. Cleveland expressed regret that he had not appointed Gresham Chief 
Justice instead of Fuller. See his biography, op. cit. supra note 50, at 505. 
See also, PECK, TWENTY YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC (1908) 308, 329, 413 
et seq.; JAMES, RICHARD OLNEY (1923) c. 9 and 10. 
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danger; that society was disintegrating, if it had not dis- 
solved." 54 
He organized a vigilance committee, promising "that he would 
take no action as Federal judge in an administrative capacity" 
without the committee's approval.5` He called for military volun- 
teers, himself enrolling first. General Benjamin Harrison, 
though deprecating hasty action and protesting that the strikers 
had just grievances, took command of one volunteer company. 
General G. H. Chapman, spewing accusations of cowardice at 
William H. English for moderate counsels, took command of 
another., Gresham's first thought was to act in subordination 
to the governmental executive of the state. But first the Gover- 
nor, and then the Mayor, rejected his services. So he instructed 
the United States marshal, General Spooner, to use the volun- 
teers as a posse. There being no ammunition for the posse, Gen- 
eral Spooner went alone to the station at Indianapolis. Upon 
his proclamation to the mob that they were in contempt of court, 
they peaceably permitted receivers' trains to move. Some of the 
leaders were subsequently arrested for their prior "contempt." .56 
Federal troops, furnished at Judge Gresham's request, were put 
under the command of the marshal. Upon his approach at the 
head of a detachment, receivers' trains moved at Terre Haute 
and Vincennes. At the request of the president of the Vandalia, 
a solvent road with no receiver, Judge Gresham ordered General 
Spooner to keep troops at Terre Haute "for moral effect." Gen- 
eral Spooner somewhat exceeded his orders. "He considered 
it a duty, in view of President Hayes' proclamation, the Judge's 
telegrams, his authority as United States Marshal, and his prac- 
tical experience as a man," to move the Vandalia mail train, 
escorting it from the Terre Haute station under orders to his 
men to shoot the first who should attempt to interfere. "The 
legal lights of Indianapolis, including the Judge," said that Gen- 
eral Spooner "did right." "7 
At Indianapolis the Judge's "Committee on Safety" hesitated 
to move trains on roads not in the hands of receivers. Finally, 
however, the Governor, yielding to importunities, added Gres- 
ham's volunteers to the organized militia under General Lew 
Wallace, and the strike was broken on all roads.58 
Though no such wealth of detail is accessible as to events in 
Illinois, it is inferrable that they were similar, except in the 
degree of directness of judicial participation, to events in In- 
diana. 
54 GRESHAM, op. cit. supra note 50, at 388. 
5, Ibid. 390. 
o Ibid. 387-398. 
57 Ibid. 399-400. 
,8 Ibid. 398. 
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IV 
In the excitement of the strike the Federal judges in Indiana 
and Illinois were but incidentally concerned with whether the 
direction of military forces was compatible with the judicial 
function in a government built upon the principle of the separa- 
tion of powers.:9 They conceived themselves as dealing with a 
situation of revolutionary exigency. They were doing their duty 
as citizens. Their position as judges made them powerful as 
citizens. To have stayed their hands, in a lacuna of law incident 
to an insurrection, upon the ground that judicial power did not 
extend to empanelling an army or a police force, would have 
been pusillanimous. 
IHad they not been judges their activities as military volun- 
teers would have been without significance in legal history. The 
powers exercised would have disappeared with the emergency 
that legitimized them. For judges, however, intervention in 
public affairs except in a judicial capacity is conventionally im- 
proper. The propriety of judicial conduct is normally estab- 
lished by judicial opinions. Occasion for judicial opinions arose 
when an extraordinary assumption of judicial power was super- 
imposed upon the assumption of military power which might 
better have been justified as natural than as judicial. The mob 
leaders arrested by the United States marshals were tried with- 
out jury and sentenced to imprisonment for contempt of court. 
Judge Gresham refused to sit in the contempt cases.60 Judge 
Drummond tried and sentenced the men arrested both in Indiana 
and in Illinois.61 
r9 They naturally, however, took care from the beginning that their acts 
should appear, as much as possible, to be done in a judicial capacity. 
Judge Gresham inquired of Judge Drummond by telegraph whether he 
had authority to direct the marshal to use military volunteers and to make 
arrests without warrant. Judge Drummond replied that he had no doubt 
of the right to take these measures. Ibid. 387. But some of Judge 
Gresham's associates thought that "it was a situation to be dealt with 
by the executive arm of the government, which could act, as those men 
thought, only through the army and the police." Ibid. 393. 
60 Ibid. 401-402. "It is proper," said Judge Drummond on opening court 
at Indianapolis, ". .. to explain why I have come. ... I understand that 
my brother judge has . . . taken a rather active part as a citizen, and 
as a good citizen, I believe, in aiding to put a stop to the contemplated 
or actual riots. . . . Under these circumstances he has felt a desire .. . 
that I should take the responsibility in the examination of the parties 
who are brought before the court." He also, though he had not sat with 
"citizen's committees," had done all that was in his power officially "to 
put an end to the state of affairs that existed throughout the country." 
61 Secor v. Toledo, Peoria & Warsaw Ry., 21 Fed. Cas. 968, 971 (C. C. 
N. D. Ill. 1877) (two opinions: finding defendants guilty and imposing 
sentences, Aug. 1, 1877; on remitting sentences, Aug. 29, 1877); King v. 
Ohio & Miss. Ry., 14 Fed. Cas. 539 (C. C. Ind. 1877). 
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The extension in these cases of the power to punish summar- 
ily for contempt of court was radical. That power theoretically 
exists because of its "necessity" in order to prevent obstruction 
of the administration of justice, and extends no further than 
that "necessity" requires.62 It is hard to find a more reasonable 
theory on which to construe obstruction of a receiver's adminis- 
tration of a railway as obstruction of the administration of jus- 
tice than this: courts administer justice; courts also administer 
railways through receivers; therefore the administration of a 
railway by a court through a receiver is an administration of 
justice. The relation of the administration of a receivership to 
the administration of justice is more closely considered in the 
Appendix. Operating receiverships had already in this country 
had a curious effect upon procedural rights in civil cases; a pas- 
senger injured by the negligent operation of a receiver's train 
could sue at law for damages only by leave of the court that ap- 
pointed the receiver, and permission ordinarily was denied.63 
But never before had a court assimilated to contempt an interfer- 
ence with receivership assets by a thief or a casual turbulent. 
For non-p-ivies to the suit in equity to which the receivership is 
incident, nothing ear-marks a business operated by a receiver as 
under special protection of judicial prerogative. It elbows its 
way, like other businesses, in a crowded world. It seeks the 
same end-private profit. It is exposed to the same weather, 
physical and social. Why should an outsider who, in the course 
even of his unlawful affairs, touches that business or is touched 
by it, find himself by the magic of that touch transported to 
another realm? 
Judge Drummond was not forced by counsel who appeared 
for the defendants in the contempt cases 64 to consider the deeper 
questions which might have been raised: the nature and limits 
of judicial power; the nature and objects of receiverships and 
of the contempt power; the compatibility of the summary pun- 
ishments with constitutional guarantees of trial by jury and due 
process of law. Conceding that under the statute passed to re- 
strict the power of Federal courts to punish for contempt he 
could not punish the defendants unless they had disobeyed or 
resisted a lawful order of the court, Judge Drummond held that 
the defendant's interference with the running of trains amounted 
to disobedience of the orders of the court directing the receivers 
62 See cases cited infra, Appendix notes 2-5. 
63 See text of Appendix following note 41. 
64 The defendants in Illinois were represented by Michael C. Quinn; in 
Indiana by A. G. Porter, William Herod, and Ferdinand Winter. The 
array of counsel for the prosecution included, in addition to the United 
States Attorneys, J. N. Jewett in Illinois; in Indiana, Benjamin Harrison, 
Charles Warren Fairbanks and A. W. Hendricks. 
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to operate trains.65 Though he recognized that disobedience of 
the orders of the court "is the only offense of which we can take 
cognizance," 66 he enlarged rather in his opinions upon the enor- 
mity of the defendants' offenses against society. His arguments 
were such as might have been addressed to a jury, under a lati- 
tude of deviation from technical issues such as jury lawyers 
are apt to strive for, or to a legislature in support of the adop- 
tion of a novel policy. He referred with feeling to the hardness 
of the times and conceded that the railway employees might have 
reason for dissatisfaction. Still, a majority of the people of the 
country probably have to support their families on less than 
railway pay.67 No one has a "right," moreover, to any particular 
rate of pay. The right of a laborer is simply to contract with his 
employer for the pay which the employer is willing to give and 
the laborer is willing to take-which is determined "by the 
demand and supply of labor." "It is a matter of common bar- 
gain and agreement, and unless it can be settled in this way we 
have to destroy all the relations of life." 68 "The proper way, 
as it seems to the court, for any class who desire to have the 
service which they perform compensated at a better rate, is to 
spread the facts touching that service before the community 
and thus create a public sentiment in their favor, so that justice 
may ultimately be done to them by their employers." G9 If re- 
ceivers' employees have grievances, "the court is always open 
to hear those grievances, consider them and instruct the receiver 
to do complete justice to all employers ..." When it is 
claimed that the rights of labor consist in not only refusing to 
labor, but in interfering with the labor of others we, of course, 
can have no feeling of respect for any such right as that. ..." " 
"Every man . . . has a right to leave the service of his employer 
. . .but men ought not to combine together and cause at once 
a strike among all railroad employees . . . because the injury 
there is public in character. . . . Suppose in seed time the farm 
hands throughout a large section of this state should come to 
the conclusion that the farmers did not pay them wages enough, 
65 See Appendix note 8. 
66 14 Fed. Cas. 540 (1877). 
6721 Fed. Cas. 970 (1877). He mentions wages of from $400 to $700 
a year as not uncommonly low. 
68 14 Fed. Cas. 541. "We cannot change the nature of man .... We 
cannot make all men alike. . . . Different kinds of labor receive different 
kinds of compensation. . . . But it is one of the glories of our common 
country that every man, if he will only exercise the talents and the in- 
dustry which he possesses, has the opportunity for rising as high as his 
talents, his industry and his capacity for business will enable him." 21 
Fed. Cas. 970. 
69 14 Fed. Cas. 542. 
70 Ibid. 541. 
71 21 Fed. Cas. 969. 
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and should combine together and go around to the various farms 
. . and prevent in this way the planting of seed? ... Would that 
be right? . . . And yet that would be the same thing in principle 
as these railroad employes have done in this case.... Suppose 
that on any of these trains there was money or property which 
was to save a man's farm or house from loss or sacrifice. Sup- 
pose that there was a traveler who was going to the bedside of a 
dying wife, husband, son or daughter...."72 "These railroads 
are among the principal means of modern civilization by which 
the business of the country is transacted. Therefore when a 
man interferes with a property whose object is so important, 
which affects so materially all the relations of society, he com- 
mits as great an offense against the rights of individuals and 
against the rights of the public as can well be imagined.... A 
public example must be made, and it must be made emphatically. 
... It is . . . indispensably necessary that the court should not 
tolerate any interference, however slight, with the management 
of the railroads . . . in its custody. . . . This thing must be 
stopped, and, so far as this court has the power to do it, it shall 
be stopped." 73 
This disquisition was unquestionably as sincere as it was fer- 
vent. In spite of occasional interjections to the effect that he 
considered "only the disobedience of the orders of the court and 
not the general criminal act," 74 it is obvious that Judge Drum- 
mond was but slightly concerned to disguise the fact that the 
policy which determined his punishments was not the policy of 
the contempt power, but the policy of protecting society, already 
disturbed by the internecine competition of capital, from the fur- 
ther disturbances of competition between capital and labor. 
V 
The policy of summary punishment for disorders incident to 
strikes which Judge Drummond inaugurated is at least debat- 
able. It is also debatable whether courts should have power to 
establish an innovation so radical. Of course it has never been 
and can never be true that "judicial power, as contradistin- 
guished from the power of the laws, has no existence;" or that 
"courts are the mere instruments of the law and can will noth- 
ing." 75 Yet such statements express an ideal which, though few 
probably would wish to see it fully realized, has deep roots in the 
common sense which, perceiving that "power is of an encroach- 
ing nature,"7' has endeavored so to shape government that 
72 14 Fed. Cas. 541, 542. 
73 21 Fed. Cas. 970. 
74 Ibid. 973. 
7 Marshall, C. J., in Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 866 (U. S. 1824). 
76 The Federalist, No. 48. 
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power shall be subject to checks and balances. That ideal has 
not been superseded by our recognition that "the true grounds 
of decision are considerations of policy and of social advantage," 
and that it is the duty of judges to weigh such considerations.77 
For fully as clear as our modern sense of this duty is our sense 
also that there are limits which courts may not pass in its ful- 
filment.78 Concrete definition of those limits somewhat baffles 
even Judge Cardozo's penetrating lucidity. But unless the theory 
of popular participation in the adoption of momentous policies 
is to be superseded by a theory of judicial Fascism, is not the 
limit, however it may be defined, passed when a court enacts that 
the popular check, through juries, upon law enforcement shall be 
abolished in a class of cases where a special usefulness of that 
check may be strongly felt? Could such a step constitutionally 
have been taken by a legislature? 
Judge Drummond's decisions, moreover, begged a question of 
priority. Which was more important in 1877-that persons 
guilty of disturbance should be punished; or that pressure should 
be exerted to abate the cruelties of the economic anarchy of 
which such disturbance was an inevitable by-product? 79 Judge 
Drummond spoke for a large constituency in making concern 
for law and order exclusive. A writer in the Nation echoed him: 
the kindest thing to untaught immigrants would be to show them 
that "society as here organized, on individual freedom of thought 
and action, is impregnable." Wages are fixed by supply and de- 
mand; "society does not owe any particular rate of wages to 
anybody." It owes "protection of life and property and personal 
rights to all its members." We should therefore strengthen the 
army and militia. And philanthropists should hold their tongues 
and not treat all things as open to discussion.80 To John Iay this 
appeared adequate: "The very devil seems to have entered into 
the lower classes of workingmen, and there are plenty of scoun- 
drels to encourage them to all lengths." '- The "light of the 
77 Holmes, J., in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N. E. 1077, 
1080 (1896), and in The Path of the Law (1897) 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467. 
78 CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) Lect. III. 
79 The British charge reported on July 31 that order was said to be 
restored; "but it is in my opinion only the acute form of the disease which 
has subsided; the seeds of future weakness which it has sown will not be 
eradicated until a more radical cure has been applied than shooting down 
the rioters, and running the trains, as was done in one case, with a Gatling 
gun in front of the locomotive. . . . The power wielded by the great 
corporations in this country is almost incredible, and in their treatment 
of their subordinates they ignore entirely the principle that property has 
its duties as well as its privileges." BRITISH REPORTS, op. cit. supra note 
33, Report No. 3. 
80 (1877) 25 NATION 68, 85, 99. 
81 THAYER, JOHN HAY (1915) 5. See also Hay's unacknowledged novel, 
THE BREADWINNERS (1884). 
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flames at Pittsburgh" seemed to reveal to a good many people 
who were perhaps rather dazzled than illumined by that light 
that "the Communist is here." 82 The militia was strengthened 
in the industrial states. This was important; but it did not 
touch the roots and causes of unrest. There were expressions 
of benevolent concern that something be done in that direction. 
The President of the United States communed anxiously with 
himself in his diary.83 The Governor of Pennsylvania discoursed 
in his annual message upon the "broader and deeper lessons of 
the strike." 84 Minds occupied with those lessons tended, however, 
to assume that the educated conscience of individuals could and 
would-unaided, it would seem, by less abstract forces-lead 
society to some vague ultimate satisfactory order. The "sym- 
pathy" upon which theoretical anarchists, since Adam Smith,85 
have relied as adequate to restrain anarchic ferocity is, to be 
sure, a real factor in human affairs, But its single power is 
insufficient to produce important progress towards civilized 
amenity. Such progress is not made until the general interest 
in amenity, which normally confines itself to pious wishing, is 
82 Supra note 22. 
s3 3 DIARY AND LETTERS OF RUTHERFORD B. HAYES (1926) 440: Aug. 5, 
1877: "The strikes have been put down by force; but now for the real 
remedy. Can't something be done by education of the strikers, by judicious 
control over the capitalists, by wise general policy to end or diminish the 
evil? The railroad strikers, as a rule, are good men, sober, intelligent and 
industrious. The mischiefs are: (1) Strikers prevent men willing to 
work from doing so. (2) They seize and hold the property of their em- 
ployers. (3) The consequent excitement furnishes an opportunity for 
the 
dangerous criminal classes to destroy life and property. Now, every man 
has a right, if he sees fit to, to quarrel with his own bread and butter, 
but he has no right to quarrel with the bread and butter of other people. 
Every man has a right to determine for himself the value of his 
own 
labor, but he has no right to determine for other men the value of their 
labor. (Not good). 
"Every man has a right to refuse to work if the wages don't suit him, 
but he has no right to prevent others from working if they are suited 
with the wages. 
"Every man has a right to refuse to work, but no man has a right to 
prevent others from working. 
"Every man has a right to decide for himself the question of wages, 
but no man has a right to decide that question for other men." 
84 MESSAGE OF GOV. JOIN F. HARTRANFT TO TIHE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 
PA., Jan. 2, 1878, 15-17: The big business of a big society makes corpora- 
tions and labor organizations both inevitable. "The people have a right 
to demand that while the profits may accrue to private individuals, their 
management shall rise above merely selfish aims, and consult also 
the 
public utility and welfare." The roads to settlement are "diffusion 
of 
higher education among the workingmen, and the conviction on the part 
of capital that it has now to deal with an equal competitor, whose 
claims 
and rights, together with its own, must be decided and adjudged by 
arbitration." 
85 Supra note 14. 
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aroused to assert itself by imposing compromise upon the parties 
to social conflict. It is not aroused until its peace is disturbed 
by pressure-often pressure which in its immediate direction 
is towards immoderate extremes. 
Labor pressure gained cohesion and momentum after 1877. 
To Samuel Gompers, then a young cigar maker in the New York 
East Side, the strike "was the tocsin which sounded a ringing 
message of hope to us all." He recognized that the unorganized 
and tumultuous character of the strike had made it barren of 
direct benefit to the strikers. But it showed the possibility of 
a labor power which, with organization and discipline, might 
affect the "natural" law that fixes wages.86 
The question for a humane impartial realist in 1877 was as to 
the extent to which even the interest in law enforcement is sub- 
ordinate to the interest in a labor pressure sufficient to lead to 
compromises. Anarchic competition can be conducive towards 
the general welfare only if under as well as upper dogs can 
bite. There is sense in Jefferson's somewhat hair-raising dictum 
as to Shay's Rebellion: "What country can preserve its liberties 
if their rulers are not warned from time to time that their people 
preserve the spirit of resistance?" 87 The sense is the same as 
that of the insistance of Socrates upon his own social value as 
a gad-fly. 
If government, as an impartial umpire of competition, is to 
exert a degree of control upon anarchic individualism,8& it must 
see to it that the fangs of one competitor be not too drastically 
blunted while those of his rival are strong. In the nineteenth 
century there was available no governmental mechanism more 
adequate to this service as between labor and capital than the 
system of trial by jury. Courts cannot be expected to recognize 
even the existence of a question as to the extent to which it is 
desirable that society shall permit itself to be stung by labor 
gad-flies. The answer, moreover, varies from time to time. Was 
not society in truth served by the state of public feeling in 1877 
which made criminal convictions of mob leaders by juries un- 
thinkable? Supposing it to be clear that the Federal judges 
unlawfully imprisoned men whom their marshals had unlaw- 
fully arrested, their prosecution or impeachment was equally 
unthinkable. If law is not to become master instead of servant 
to society, it is essential that natural feeling should in special 
S GOMPERS, SEVENTY YEARS OF LIFE AND LABOR (1925) 140. 
87 Quoted 1 BEVERIDGE, MARSHALL (1916-19) 303, from 5 JEFFERSON, WRIT- 
INGS (Ford) 263, 362. 
88 Cf. President Hoover, as quoted in newspapers of Oct. 8, 1930, and 
in (1930) 12 LAW AND LABOR 249: "In the American system, through free 
and universal education, we train the runners [in the race of life]; we 
strive to give them an equal start, our Government is the umpire of its 
fairness." 
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instances have power to prevent unnatural rigor of law enforce- 
ment. And it is as true in law as in mechanics that a structure 
which must oppose extraordinary stresses with unyielding 
rigidity is less durable than a structure which is flexible, or 
from which pressure can be diverted. The jury's power of ex- 
ception in cases where the grounds of exception, though strongly 
felt, elude legal generalization, has served rather to maintain 
than to impair the integrity of normally satisfactory rules of 
law.89 Without it hard cases would make bad law more often 
than they do. In some instances, moreover, the resistance of 
the "natural reason" of juries to the "artificial reason" of the 
law has contributed to change bad law for good. Erskine's argu- 
ments prevailed in the long run over Lord Mansfield's doctrines 
of seditious libel; truth became a defense, and criticism of public 
men and measures became a right.90 Juries in personal injury 
cases resented the fellow servant rule; the principle of Work- 
men's Compensation laws is in process of extension. Is it not 
likely that legislation would have gone much further than it has 
towards abating the causes of friction between workmen and 
employers if juries had had more to do with strike cases? Of 
course the jury's power of exception would have been abused 
in such cases as in others. All power is subject to be abused. 
If it has become true that abuse of power by juries is more 
evident than their salutary use of it, it is either because power 
to select competent jurors has not been well used, or, if the 
jurors selected are in fact fairly representative of average hon- 
esty and intelligence, because those qualities in our people are 
far gone in decay. If a people is healthy, it cannot afford to 
surrender its direct participation in the administration of justice. 
For when law is administered by judges and juries, the justice 
and injustice that result are more truly the justice and injustice 
of society than when law is administered by judges only. When 
a jury verdict is felt as oppressive, the grievance is against 
society and its law. But a sense of grievance toward a judicial 
decision is against the judge or the courts. In spite of the truth 
89 See Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial (1929) 12 J. AM. 
JUD. Soc. 166, 169-171. Dean Wigmore points out that most of the ob- 
jections to jury trial as we now see it-those stressed, for example, by 
Leon Green, Why Trial by Jury? (1928) 15 AM. MERCURY 316-could be 
remedied if we cared to take the trouble; and that jury trial serves these 
important objects: (1) It prevents popular distrust of bureaucratic jus- 
tice; (2) It permits desirable instances of exception to the application of 
legal rules without the destruction of the rules which would result from 
exception by judges; (3) It educates citizens in the administration of law; 
(4) It checks biased fact findings; for jury verdicts require reconciliation 
of varied minds and temperaments. Cf. Comment, Rate Litigation-Fact 
Determination by Judicial Guesswork (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 81. 
90 See CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920) 23; 8 LORD CAMPBELL, LIVES 
OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS (5th ed. 1868) c. 178-181. 
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of most of the facts adduced by adverse critics of the jury 
system in its modern state of degeneration, "there are still rea- 
sons for its support which lie deep in the philosophy of the 
human mind." 91 
VI 
To contemporary observers of the strike the summary punish- 
ments of a few participants were minor episodes. To the news- 
papers the Donohue case in New York 92 was as important as 
the cases in the Middle West. The general public, tired of the 
strike and shrinking always from law, except when it is drama- 
tized in jury trials, as an esoteric mystery, gave them little at- 
tention. Editorial comment was in general superficial and ap- 
proving.93 The only important expression of concern at the 
91 Cooley, Newz Aspects of the Right of Trial by Jury (1877) 25 AM. L. 
REG. 705, 721. 
'2 Matter of Barney Donohue, 12 N. Y. Daily Register 321 (Aug. 18, 
1877) (earlier proceedings reported in issues of July 30 and 31 and Aug. 
1); see also N. Y. Evening Post, July 26, 28, 30, 31, Aug. 15, 17, 1877. 
The order of the court recited that Donohue had wilfully resisted an order 
of June 15, 1875, directing Hugh J. Jewett as receiver to operate the Erie, 
by preventing the movement of trains on July 20, 1877. Donohue's coun- 
sel relied solely upon technicalities-chiefly upon the point that the citation 
of Donohue to answer interrogatories violated his constitutional immunity 
against self-crimination. The Court, Charles Donohue, J., said: "The 
Erie road being in the hands of the officer of this Court and his possession 
being attacked, it became the duty of the Court to protect it. Substan- 
tially, I do not understand the prisoner's counsel as denying that if the 
papers are in form correct, and the facts proved, that there is any doubt 
of the right of this Court to punish; but if the right had been denied, the 
action of all the Courts that followed the course pursued here [this re- 
ference is to the opinions of Judge Drummond discussed supra] has 
decided the question in the affirmative." Since the prisoner Donohue was 
also subject to criminal prosecution for his acts, and since his confederates 
had desisted from disorder upon his citation for contempt, only thirty 
days imprisonment was imposed for the contempt. Mr. Justice Donohue 
doubted the constitutionality of federal military intervention and found 
cause for gratification in the fact that "that which, unfortunately, else- 
where the federal military power was invoked to accomplish was here 
enforced by the power of the Courts." Counsel for Barney Donohue (re- 
tained by a "Bread Winners' League"): General Roger Pryor and ex- 
judge George M. Curtis; for the Erie receiver: Laroque and McFarland. 
93 "The last thing that ever could occur to any of the strikers would 
be that they were by their acts guilty of a contempt of court. This, how- 
ever, was the case in several instances, where the railroads interfered 
with were being operated by receivers, and the only rioters thus far punished 
were those who have been committed for contempt." 16 ALBANY L. JOUR. 
110 (Aug. 18, 1877). It appears from a subsequent editorial deploring 
Judge Drummond's remission of contempt sentences that the editor had 
no intention of questioning their propriety. Ibid. 158 (Sept. 8). 
"If thirty days is a sufficient imprisonment for a man who does his 
best to reduce the society of a great community to a state of anarchy, our 
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implications of the decisions was by Judge Cooley.94 
penal scale should be revised." (1877) 25 NATION 111. The allusion is to 
the Donohue case, supra note 92. 
94 Op. cit. supra note 91, at 715-720. Judge Cooley approached the 
question from a general consideration of other exercises of extra- 
ordinary power in receiverships. He implies, though he does not pur- 
sue, a doubt as to the appropriateness of judicial operation of railways: 
"The receivership is not a matter ancillary to the settlement of rights and 
adjustment of equities in a pending suit .... the suit becomes an incident 
to the receivership, not the receivership to the suit." The doctrine that it is 
contempt of court to sue a receiver without leave strikes him "as unnecessary 
to the receiver's possession, and unsound. ... It is obviously one thing 
to . . enjoin suits for the property in his hands, and quite a different 
thing to shield him against the consequences of his own trespasses, negli- 
gences, or refusals to observe his contracts." He questions "whether the 
extent of the protection accorded to receivers has not insensibly been en- 
larged so as to embrace cases not within the original intent.... A riot 
on the New York Central Railroad which interferes with the running 
of its trains is only a riot; but on the Erie Railroad it is a contempt of 
the Court of Chancery. In the one case only a jury can deal with it, 
and twelve men must agree concerning its legal bearings; in the other 
a single judge may administer summary punishment. This may be a 
useful power, but it is an enormous power, and it is not surrounded by 
the usual securities which protect individual liberty; and we may be rea- 
sonably certain that its frequent exercise will lead to new consideration 
of the logical foundations of jury trial, and perhaps also of the limitations 
to the power to punish as judicial contempts acts not committed in the 
presence of the court. Rights and protections ought to be the same every- 
where; the property which the receiver manages for its owners is no 
more sacred than that which the owners manage in person; it ought to 
have the same protection and no more. 
"It has not been our purpose to question the correctness of any recent 
judicial action, but rather to direct attention to some very noticeable and 
important facts. One of the most remarkable of these is, and one de- 
serving of special attention and reflection, that since the late riots great 
gratification has been expressed in various publications, that the courts 
were enabled in certain cases to bring the rioters summarily before them 
and to inflict speedy and effectual punishment without delay or the op- 
portunity to appeal to a popular tribunal. This gratification has had 
no regard to the fact that the property was peculiarly situated; that was 
only a circumstance which was thought fortunately to afford opportunity 
for the summary remedy; and the latter has been treated as a good thing 
in itself. 
"Now the power of the courts to punish for contempts is exceedingly 
vague and indeterminate. . . . For the most part [it] is in the breast 
of a single judge, without fixed rule or landmark limiting his discretion. 
But manifestly if a discretionary authority like this is good and useful 
in some cases it is good in all similar cases, and its exercise ought not 
to depend on a circumstance that in no manner affects the degree of 
offence or the just rights of the accused to a deliberate and careful trial. 
The logical conclusion is that it would be better for the state that some 
tribunal-perhaps a court, perhaps a ruler unrestrained by constitution 
or statute-should have discretionary power to deal with all breaches of 
order as contempts of authority, and to punish them without the hindrance 
which the necessity of associating himself with others for the trial might 
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Obviously, under the theory of summary power adopted by 
Judge Drummond, railways under receivers were in exactly the 
same position as if they were protected against unlawful inter- 
ference by injunctions binding upon all the world. President 
Scott of the Pennsylvania Railroad was as quick as Judge Cooley 
to note that the limitation of this extraordinary protection to 
roads undergoing receiverships was arbitrarily discriminatory.95 
He advocated Congressional legislation extending the summary 
power to all cases of disturbance of the operation of roads car- 
rying mails or interstate commerce: 
"It will hardly be contended that the railroad companies must 
become bankrupt in order to make secure the uninterrupted 
movement of traffic over their lines, or to entitle them to the 
efficient protection of the United States government. . . . The 
laws which give the Federal courts the summary process of 
injunction to restrain so comparatively trifling a wrong as in- 
fringement of a patent right certainly must have been intended 
or ought to give the United States authority to prevent a wrong- 
doing which not only destroys a particular road but also par- 
alyzes the commerce of the country and wastes the national 
wealth." 
This, it is believed, was the first suggestion of the possibility 
of labor injunctions in the United States. 
cause. The expressions referred to are distinct admissions of belief that 
the restraints which we impose on power are worse than useless, and 
they exhibit us in the aspect of abhorring unbridled authority in theory 
while we applaud it in practice." 
95 In his article cited supra note 39. 
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APPENDIX-RECEIVERSHIPS AND THE CON- 
TEMPT POWER 
I. THE CONTEMPT QUESTION 
SOMETIMES courts say that legal generalizations apply only to 
cases within their reason. At other times, however, they hold 
a rule applicable to a case within its letter when the application 
in truth raises a novel and perhaps disputable question of policy. 
This is one of the techniques of legal change. It is illustrated 
in the contempt cases of 1877. 
The power to punish summarily for contempt is an exception 
to the ordinary requirements of due process of law.1 The ex- 
ception is justified by the expediency-loosely called "necessity" 
-of prompt and vigorous action to prevent or remove obstruc- 
tions of the administration of justice.2 Justice is duly adminis- 
tered when legal duties incident to a litigation-duties of wit- 
nesses to testify, for example, not legal duties of whatsoever 
nature-are specifically performed.8 The summary power, un- 
less limited by statute, extends to whatever is within the "neces- 
sity" on which it rests 4-but no further.5 Obviously it cannot, 
compatibly with its nature and policy, extend to anything that is 
not an obstruction of the administration of justice, or to any 
case in which its exercise would tend to subvert the due ad- 
ministration of justice which it exists to serve. The law of 
contempt can have coherence and logic only if the minds 
which administer it look steadily at the limits implicit in the 
nature and policy of the summary power. To look rather at 
definitions of particular contempts invites confusion. This also 
is illustrated in the contempt cases of 1877. 
The interference by strike mobs with the judicial operation 
of railways was clearly within the language of a definition for 
which abundant judicial reiteration was citable: "any wrongful 
disturbance of a receiver's possession is a contempt of court." 8 
14 BL. COMM. 280. 
2 Ibid. 286; Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 327, 24 Sup Ct. 665, 666 
(1904); Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 383, 39 Sup. Ct. 337, 339 
(1919). 
a Hough, J., in Rosner v. United States, 10 F. (2d) 675 (C. C. A. 2d, 
1926): "there is a difference between obstructing justice, and obstructing 
the administration of justice." 
4 The power must be ample; but its amplitude "is a command never to 
exert it where it is not necessary or proper." Gompers v. Bucks Stove & 
Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 451, 31 Sup. Ct. 492, 502 (1911). 
5 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227 (U. S. 1821). 
6 Judge Drummond cited no authorities specifically, saying only that 
"it has been considered by all the authorities, the Supreme Court of the 
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No lawyer could argue that the interference was not wrongful; 
the property affected was in the hands of receivers; the mobs 
had notice of the receiverships. The dogma covered the facts; 
and such legal minds as were available for defendants in strike 
cases, baffled by the superficial tightness of the case against 
them, saw no way to impeach or qualify the dogma. Yet 
throughout the period of its application in strike cases dissatis- 
faction smouldered.7 Judge Cooley was not alone in feeling 
that the contempt power was out of bounds when it punished 
exuberances of social unrest as obstructions of the due adminis- 
triation of justice. 
Only the soundness of this feeling will be here considered. 
If the cases were within the policy of the contempt power, any 
inadequacy of Judge Drummond's attempt to show that they 
were within one of the specific categories of contempt to which 
the power was confined by Federal statute might be condoned; 
if they were outside the policy, no statutory question was prop- 
erly up for consideration.` 
United States among others, that any wrongful disturbance of the pos- 
session of property held by a receiver, is a contempt of the authority of 
the court." 21 Fed. Cas. at 971. The reporter added a note to the effect 
that the authorities can be found in 2 DANIELL, CHANCERY PRACTICE (4th 
Am. ed. 1871) 1743 and in HIGII, RECEIVERS (1st ed. 1876) §§ 163-174. 
The relevant cases cited by Daniell and High are among those cited infra 
notes 25 and 26. 
The expressions of the Supreme Court to which Judge Drummond re- 
ferred were doubtless those in Wiswall v. Sampson, infra note 25, and in 
a general disquisition obitcr in Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 217-218 (1872). 
7 The following cases were substantially similar in facts and result to 
the cases described in the preceding article, cited therein in note 61: In re 
Doolittle, 23 Fed. 544 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1885, Brewer and Treat, JJ.); 
United States v. Kane, 23 Fed. 748 (C. C. Colo. 1885, Brewer, J.-cf. Frank 
v. D. & R. G. Ry., ibid. 757); In re Wabash Ry., 24 Fed. 217 (C. C. W. D. 
Mo. 1885, Krekel, J.), s. c. on rehearing, United States v. Berry, ibid. 780; 
In re Higgins, 27 Fed. 443 (C. C. N. D. Tex. 1886, Pardee, J.); Thomas v. 
C. N. O. & T. P. Ry., 62 Fed. 803 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1894, Taft, J.) There 
were other cases prior to 1894 which were not reported. 
In 1885 the Knights of Labor passed resolutions demanding the im- 
peachment of Judges Treat, Krekel and Brewer "for malfeasance in office 
and for high treason to the American people," and commending Major Wil- liam Warner and General John M. Palmer "for their manly and gratuitous 
defence of our distressed brothers." BUCHANAN, STORY OF A LABOR AGI- 
TATOR (1903) 230. 
8 The statute provided "that the power of the several courts of the 
United States to issue attachments and inflict summary punishments for 
contempts of court shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehaviour of any person or persons in the presence of said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the mis- 
behaviour of any of the officers of the said courts in their official transac- 
tions, and the disobedience or resistance by any officer of the said courts, 
party, juror, witness, or any other person or persons, to any lawful writ, 
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Grounds for question whether the summary punishments were 
process, order, rule, decree or command of the said courts." 4 STAT. 487 
(1831); U. S. C. § 385 (1926). 
The object of this statute, which was provoked by a punishment for 
newspaper criticism calculated to affect pending cases, was to confine the 
exercise of the power to cases clearly within its policy even at the cost of 
excluding from its exercise other cases arguably within its policy. Unless 
within the exceptions as to misconduct of officers and "disobedience or 
resistance," any obstruction of the administration of justice topographically 
remote from the presence of the court was to be punishable, if at all, only 
after conviction by a jury. Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication 
(1928) 28 COL. L. REV. 401, 525-532. 
Recent cases construe the "so near" clause as embracing all obstructions, 
however remote, making the statutory limitations meaningless. Cf. Toledo 
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560 (1918). 
rn the seventies, however, the language and intention of the statute were 
still respected. See Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510-511 (U. S. 1873). 
Judge Drummond deemed it necessary to show that the defendants had 
disobeyed or resisted a lawful command. The receivers had been ordered 
to operate the railways. Judge Drummond held that the defendants, by 
obstructing the execution of these orders had themselves "disobeyed" the 
orders. 21 Fed. Cas. at 972. He would have looked in vain for decisions 
indicating that a judicial command could be disobeyed except by a person 
to whom it was addressed. 
How the construction of language may be influenced by the fact that 
it is or is not the language of a statute is illustrated by two cases decided 
in 1897. In England, where the "inherent" or common law contempt power 
is not limited by statute, it was held that the doing of a thing enjoined 
(conducting a boxing match on certain premises) by a person who had 
not himself been enjoined was not a disobedience of the injunction by 
that person-though since it was a contumacious obstruction of the ad- 
ministration of justice by that person he was punishable notwithstanding. 
Seaward v. Paterson, [1897] 1 Ch. 545. In the United States, where, in 
the view then held of the "so near" clause, the doing of a thing enjoined 
by a person not enjoined was not punishable at all unless it was disobedi- 
ence, it was held to be disobedience-in effect ratifying Judge Drummond's 
statutory construction. In Re Lennon, 166 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 658 (1897). 
The reports of the 1877 strike cases show that in addition to the 
orders to the receivers to operate, the courts had issued orders in the 
nature of writs of assistance directing their marshals to do everything 
necessary in order to enable the receivers to run trains. It might be 
inferred that Judge Drummond could, with less strain on language than 
was involved in his findings of disobedience, have described the contempts 
as resistance to the execution of writs of assistance. That was Attorney 
General Devens' expectation. It seems, however, that the defendants did 
not in fact resist the marshals, but were punished for interferences with 
trains prior to the marshals' execution of the orders in the nature of 
writs of assistance. 1 GRESHAM, LIFE OF WALTER Q. GRESHAM (1919) 
387, 393, 394, 398-9. In view of the peculiar nature of writs of assistance 
(see infra note 34) it may be doubted whether resistance to their execu- 
tion is reasonably to be considered a contempt unless it is in the interest 
of a party to litigation. See Lacon v. De Groat, 10 T. L. R. 24 (1893). 
Argument for strict construction of statutory words is, however, aside 
from the purpose of this article-though not from that of the framers 
the Federal contempt statute. 
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not subversive of policies paramount to the policy of the con- 
tempt power have been suggested in the preceding article. In 
this appendix attention is invited to what is conceived to be 
the irrelation of operating receiverships, in their contacts with 
the general public, to the administration of justice. 
If a court, at the instance of judgment creditors, should in- 
vest the assets of a judgment debtor in the stock market in 
the hope of making them adequate to satisfy the judgments, 
what relation would the investments have to the administration 
of justice? If the court's broker should embezzle the securities, 
could he be said to have obstructed the administration of justice? 
Would a judge managing a business venture in person in the 
interest of parties to a law suit carry his judicial capacity with 
him to the broker's office? Is his agency an agency for the 
law or an agency for the parties? If he appoints a sub-agent, 
who looks for compensation to the parties through the subject 
matter of the venture, is the sub-agent the "hand of the court," 
and are his possession and management the possession and 
management of the court itself? Is the protection of his posses- 
sion and management "against all the world" within the "neces- 
sity" which justifies exception from the ordinary requirements 
of due process of law in order to abate obstruction of the due 
administration of justice? 
II. RECEIVERS AS CUSTODIANS AND AS MANAGERS 
The reason a court sometimes takes charge of private property 
pending litigation is to assure that the effectuation of its ad- 
judications of private rights in the property shall not be im- 
paired by prior acts in the interests of parties to the cause. "A 
receiver is an indifferent person between the parties to a cause, 
appointed by the court to receive and preserve the property or 
fund in litigation pendente lite, when it does not seem reason- 
able to the court that either party should hold it." "To warrant 
the interposition of a court of equity by the aid of a receiver, 
it is essential that the plaintiff should show, first, either a clear 
legal right in himself to the property in controversy, or that 
he has some lien upon it, or that it constitutes a special fund 
out of which he is entitled to satisfaction of his demand. Andt 
secondly, it must appear . . . that the property itself, or the 
income from it, is in danger of loss from the neglect, waste, 
misconduct or insolvency of the defendant." The suit in per- 
sonam in which a chancery receivership is initiated becomes 
upon the appointment of the receiver substantially a proceed- 
ing in rem, to which all claimants of rights in the res, or of 
rights theretofore accrued against the defendant which may be 
satisfiable out of proceeds of the res, stand in the relation of 
quasi parties. "A court of equity, by its order appointing a 
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receiver, takes the entire subject matter of the litigation out 
of the control of the parties and into its own hands, and ulti- 
mately disposes of all questions, legal or equitable, growing out 
of the proceeding." "The purpose for which a receiver takes 
possession is closely allied to that of a sheriff in levying under 
execution, except that the scope of the receiver's authority is 
more comprehensive, since he is usually required to pay all de- 
mands upon the fund in his hands, to the extent of that fund." 9 
The original idea of a receiver is that he is a custodian-the 
keeper of the chancellor's pound. But even early instances in 
which a receiver was held down to an entirely inactive custody 
of inactive property were probably few. At the beginning of 
the nineteenth century he was most often appointed to protect 
the interest of a junior mortgagee in a landed estate, collecting 
rents, making leases, and even, by special leave of court, con- 
tracting for repairs. In suits to dissolve partnerships owning 
breweries or collieries Lord Thurlow appointed receivers to pre- 
vent squabbling partners from destroying the adventure: "I 
have even," he said, "taken the management from them some- 
times." 10 A distinction between receiverships and managements 
has always been strongly felt in England; the double title "re- 
ceiver and manager" is there still usual.11 And the chancellors, 
feeling that supervision of the management of a business was 
inappropriate to the judicial function, strenuously resisted ap- 
plications for managers. Lord Eldon felt obliged by Lord 
Thurlow's practice to take over the management of the Drury 
Lane Theatre-and repented it. When later he was asked to 
appoint a manager of the Italian Opera House, he refused; to 
do so would "justify an expectation that this court is to carry 
on every brewery and every speculation in the kingdom." He 
would liquidate the business; order it sold or foreclosed; "deal 
with it as property: but no further." 12 In other cases, when 
he could not harangue the parties into agreeing as to manage- 
ment, or compel the managing partner to manage equitably by 
injunction, he sometimes appointed managers for brief service 
pending liquidation, usually not till after decree for dissolution.13 
In the case of the Covent Garden Theatre, saying "that it was 
9 The quotations are from HIGH, op. cit. supra note 6, at 2, 11, 5, 3. 
Their equivalents may be found in any text book on receivers. 
10 Ex parte O'Reilly, 1 Ves. Jr. 112, 130 (1790). 
11 KERR, RECEIVERS (9th ed. 1930) c. 9. It is evidence of the stability 
and coherence of which law- is capable when it is treated more as law 
and less as a conjurer's bag than happens in this country that the struc- 
ture and much of the text in the 1930 edition of Kerr are the same as 
in the first edition, 1869. 
12 Waters v. Taylor, 15 Ves. Jr., 10, 25-28 (1807-8); for subsequent 
proceedings see Taylor v. Waters, 1 My. & Cr. 266 (1836). 
13 See his cases cited in 2 DANIELL, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1727. 
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not the business of the court to manage or carry on from time 
to time a partnership of any kind," he would not appoint a 
manager; but he appointed a receiver to act as treasurer.'4 And 
when, in the middle of the century, railway and other public 
service companies commenced to defeat the hopes of investors, 
the courts conformed as nearly as possible to this precedent. 
Receivers were appointed at the suit of bondholders or judg- 
ment creditors, with fiscal duties with respect to tolls or income; 
but managenment was left in the company.15 The courts did not 
say squarely that their duty as courts was to adjudge claims 
and order them satisfied so far as practicable, and that to engage 
in business in order to provide funds from which claims could 
be satisfied was an entirely different matter. But it is believed 
that their perception that railway management is inconsistent 
with the judicial function was a stronger ground for their refusal 
to undertake it than the technical ground which legalism put 
foremost, viz., lack of power to take the management of a public 
undertaking from those to whom Parliament by charter had 
entrusted it.16 
The attitude of American courts was in extraordinary con- 
trast. Power to appoint managing receivers was assumed by 
the Federal courts without legislation and without adjudica- 
tion.7 There were instances of real judicial reluctance to make 
14 Const v. Harris, 1 Turn. & Russ. 496, 518, 528 (1824). Chancellor 
Walworth of New York appointed a receiver of a newspaper for no longer 
"than is absolutely necessary to prevent a sacrifice of the property;" until 
sale, the defendants were to continue in editorial charge, under the direc- 
tion of the receiver, who was to be personally liable for any improper 
publication. Martin v. Van Schaick, 4 Paige 479 (N. Y. 1834). 
1, A grant of managing powers to a receiver was condemned as inad- 
vertent in Russell v. East Anglian Ry., 3 M'N. & G. 128 (1850). See the 
directions as to forms of orders limiting the receiver's powers in Fripp v. 
Chard R.R., 11 Hare 239, 262 (1853) and Gardner v. London, Chatham 
& Dover Ry., L. R. 2 Ch. App. 201, 223 (1867). See KERR, RECEIVERS (2d 
Am. ed. 1877) 66-80. 
16 The judgment of Lord Cairns in Gardner v. London, Chatham & Dover 
Ry., supra note 15, was clearly as much influenced by the first as by the 
second consideration. 
The Railways Act of 1867, 30 & 31 VICT. c. 127, § 4, gives only to judg- 
ment creditors the right to obtain a manager of a statutory undertaking, 
i. e., a public service corporation. KERR, op. cit. supra note 11, at 68, 308. 
The court will appoint at the suit of mortgagees a receiver of the fiscal 
officer type; or the mortgagees may themselves appoint a receiver or man- 
ager (formerly only if the mortgage so provided; now by statute), who, 
however, is their own agent or the company's, not the court's. Ibid. c. 14. 
Even under the Railways Act, supra, "it is submitted that the Court has 
no power to authorize a receiver or anyone else to carry on the undertaking 
except as agent for the undertakers." Ibid. 308. 
7 Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 21 How. 112 (U. S. 1858), 
is sometimes cited as an authority for the appointment of managing re- 
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the courts instruments to promote the business interests of li- 
tigants or of the financiers behind them.18 From the beginning 
there were often circumstances in connection with corporate 
receiverships which raised a suspicion of foul play-not easy, 
in view of the faintness of the light thrown by reported cases 
upon the real aim and tendency of complicated transactions, to 
verify or to rebut.l9 Judges ethically fastidious were wary of 
permitting their courts to be used for ends not always apparent 
on the surface. But the Federal courts in middle western and 
southern circuits had but few important matters on their dockets. 
Some judges were doubtless flattered when national leaders of 
the bar pressed respectfully for protection of vast pecuniary 
interests. The patronage incident to protection was, moreover, 
fat. And if the Federal court would not appoint managers, a 
state court often would.20 Moreover, when a court accepted 
jurisdiction real services to justice could be, and often were, 
rendered. With most judges the convention of reluctance in- 
herited from Lord Eldon became little more than a form of 
words. Had interests opposed to the confusion of the adminis- 
tration of justice with the administration of business been audi- 
ceivers. But the receivership there sanctioned was rather a receivership 
of the tolls, on the English model. 
18 Collected by M. M. Cohn, Railroad Receiverships (1885) 19 AM. L. 
REV. 400. Justice Miller and District (later Circuit) Judge Caldwell were 
conspicuous in resistance to pressures to appoint managers. 
19 For example, one of the earliest "general" receiverships was at the 
instance of an embarrassed railway company itself, in the alleged inter- 
ests (1) of the public, which would suffer if it ceased operation, and (2) 
of its bondholders (who, however, were not parties), in a suit to enjoin 
its judgment creditors from levying executions. The railway was ordered 
sold as a whole and its proceeds distributed among its creditors. It was 
bought in for what looks like a song-though it may have been a fair price. 
A large holder of bonds protested and declined to file a claim. In his sub- 
sequent suit his lien on the road was held to have been wiped out. Macon 
& Western R. R. v. Parker, 9 Ga. 377 (1851). 
Chief Justice Chase declined jurisdiction of a similar bill by a corpora- 
tion against its judgment creditors. Hugh v. McRae, Fed. Cas. No. 6,840. 
(C.C. S. C. 1869). But Justice (then Judge) Brewer appointed receivers 
of the Wabash ex parte. See Wabash etc. R. R. v. Central Trust Co., 22 
Fed. 272 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1884). Objections deeper than to this pro- 
cedural anomaly applied equally to many receiverships in "friendly" suits. 
See Moorfield Storey, The Reorganization of Railway and Other Corpo- 
rations (1896) 30 AM. L. REV. 801; Chamberlain, New Fashioned Receiver- 
ships (1896) 10 HARV. L. REV. 139; Thompson, The Court Management of 
Railroads (1893) 27 AM. L. REV. 481. 
20 In Williamson v. New Albany R. R., 30 Fed. Cas. No. 17,753 (C. C. 
D. Ind. 1857), Justice McLean declined to appoint a receiver in a fore- 
closure suit. The plaintiff then got a receiver and put through a shady 
reorganization in a state court. Judge Drummond, holding that Federal 
jurisdiction had attached in 1857, held these proceedings void and appointed 
a receiver. Bill v. New Albany Ry., Fed. Cas. No. 1,407 (1870). 
540 [Vol. 40 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.224 on Sat, 15 Jun 2013 19:59:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1931] LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF A STRIKE 
ble through counsel, perhaps the step would not have been taken. 
But the initiation of a receivership was usually virtually ex 
parte. In form there was a suit, with plaintiff and defendant. 
But the defendant admitted the allegations of the bill and joined 
in the prayer.21 Any substantial questions to be litigated came 
up later on intervening petitions. The consent receiver was 
given managing powers without the addition of the word "man- 
ager" to his title. It is believed that there was never an impor- 
tant judicial consideration of the compatibility of protracted 
railway management with the judicial function. In 1881 Justice 
Miller, in a dissenting opinion, pointed out that the appointment 
of railway receivers, "as well as the power conferred on them, 
and the duration of their office, has made a progress which, 
since it is wholly the work of courts of chancery and not of 
legislatures, may well suggest a pause for consideration." 22 
But this came late; Justice Miller noted in the same opinion 
that of five hundred or more railway companies in his circuit 
(the eighth, west of the Mississippi) hardly more than half a 
dozen had escaped the hands of a receiver. Power to appoint 
managing receivers, without ever having been a question, had 
become a fact. 
But though the question of power to set up managing receiv- 
erships was perhaps no longer open, it was not too late so to 
define their legal nature as to prevent consequences subversive 
of ordinary rights and remedies. A theory of their nature 
adequate for that purpose lay within easy reach. Sense of it, 
though often inarticulate, has molded a large body of usage. 
It rests upon the obvious distinction between the receiver as 
custodian and the receiver as manager. 
There can be no practical objection to regarding the receiver- 
custodian as the hand of the court to hold property safe beyond 
the reach of all who have claims to or against it founded on 
transactions prior to his appointment. As to them, and all 
others acting in their interests (which it may be convenient to 
call "pre-receivership interests"), the property lies as if static 
in an imaginary pound until their rights shall have been ad- 
judicated and such satisfaction as is equitable shall have been 
awarded. The impounding is for their own ultimate benefit. 
But if the property is a business, their interests demand that 
it be maintained as a going concern. That demand cannot be 
complied with if the property must be deemed impounded as 
21 "Out of one hundred and fifty cases spread over the last thirty years 
. . . there were eighty in which the president of the road in question was 
appointed receiver; twenty-five others were general managers; seventeen, 
superintendents; and sixteen, vice-presidents." SWAIN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS 
OF RAILROAD RECEIVERSHIPS (1898) 98. 
22 Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126, 137 (1881). 
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against all the world. Compliance with it is a favor to pre- 
receivership interests.23 It would be reasonable for the courts 
to say to these interests: "The consequence of our granting 
this favor is that the property can be deemed impounded only 
as against yourselves. The receiver as custodian is the court's 
agent to assure that you do not interfere with the orderly ef- 
fectuation by the court of your respective rights. But the re- 
ceiver as manager is your agent, not the court's. The court 
will supervise and direct him and hold him accountable to you 
as trustee.24 Beyond that, the business in its exposure for your 
benefit to the outside world can have no other rights, remedies, 
privileges or immunities than the law gives to any other busi- 
ness of the same nature." 
III. INTERFERENCE WITH RECEIVERSHIPS AS CONTEMPT 
PRIOR TO 1877 
The cases prior to 1877 in which it had been laid down that 
the court would protect its receiver's possession from unau- 
thorized disturbance, whether by violence or by suits at law, 
were consistent with this theory. In the "leading cases" there 
was in fact no question of disturbing the receiver's possession 
or of contempt of court.2' The holdings were that after a re- 
23 Much has been said as to the public interest in maintaining insolvent 
railways as going concerns through receivers. See, e. g., the majority 
opinion in Barton v. Barbour, supra note 22; Union Trust Co. v. Illinois 
Midland Ry., 117 U. S. 434 (1886). The public is not represented by coun- 
sel in a private equity suit. An appropriate way for it to protect its inter- 
est would be by legislation. 
There is of course no reason why a business should have greater im- 
munities when it is operated by a public officer for the purpose of preventing 
its cessation of service than when it is operated by its private owners. In 
both cases the pecuniary interests in its earnings are private. 
'4 There seems to be no objection to calling a receiver a trustee more 
substantial than that he has no legal title to the property in his charge. 
CLARK, RECEIVERS, (2d ed. 1929) § 43. The word "agent" would meet 
that objection. See note 16 supra. Receivers appointed otherwise than 
by a court are not judicial officers. CLARK, op. cit. supra, at § 11 (c). 
In an interesting case, a receiver appointed by debenture holders under 
the terms of their mortgage sought to restrain the collection from property 
in his hands of a fine for an offense of selling adulterated milk committed 
during his management. The court indignantly denied the injunction. 
Jarvis v. Islington Borough Council, 73 J. P. (N. C.) 323 (Ch. Div. 1909). 
Yet if he had been appointed by a judge the distraint to collect the fine 
would in this country conventionally be regarded as a contempt. 
25 In Angel v. Smith, 9 Ves. Jr. 335 (1804), the question was as to an 
action of ejectment which had been brought without leave of the Chancellor 
for lands in the possession of a chancery receiver. Lord Elden "cautioned 
the Solicitor that he would proceed at his peril," saying that it was a 
contempt to disturb sequestrators or receivers: for when a receiver has 
been appointed in a suit the proper way to assert a claim adverse to those 
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ceiver had taken possession no valid title to the "estates in the 
cause" could be established by proceedings in another court 
without leave of the chancellor. For how could the chancellor do 
his duty of determining all rights in the res if rights which 
he decreed, or those of the purchaser under his decree, might 
be upset by a title which had never been before him? 
In another class of cases persons acting in behalf of pre-receiv- 
ership interests-against which, under the theory suggested, 
pound walls would be maintained-had seized (usually under 
process at law) property in the hands of, or money payable to, 
a receiver, or had entered the property asserting possessory 
rights. The due administration of justice requires that pre- 
receivership claims be enforced against the property only as 
allowed by the chancellor "in the cause." The disturbers were 
in contempt. But such contempts were not punished. They 
were dealt with as civil torts, in effect as by injunction requir- 
ing desistance and reparation on pain of punishment if the 
requirement were not complied with.26 When such a require- 
of the parties was by coming in to be examined pro intercsse suo. But 
finding that the ejectment would be the best way of determining the claim, 
"the Lord Cancellor, after much discussion," permitted it to proceed. 
In Wiswall v. Sampson, 14 How. 52 (U. S. 1852), the question was as to 
title to real estate. The successful claimant had purchased at a sale di- 
rected by a state court of equity in a suit in which a receiver had been 
appointed. While this receiver was in possession a Federal marshal had 
sold the property to the unsuccessful claimant in execution of a judgment 
at law in the Federal court. Incidentally to its holding that the marshal's 
sale was void the court said, on the authority of Angel v. Smith, that 
"when a receiver has been appointed, his possession is that of the court, 
and any attempt to disturb it, without leave of the court first obtained, 
will be a contempt on the part of the person making it." The execution 
sale did not in fact disturb the receiver's possession. The holding was 
simply that it was ineffectual to give title. 
'2 Defendants or claimants of pre-receivership rights enjoined from at- 
tempting to enforce their claims without leave: Johnes v. Claughton, Jac. 
573 (1822); Langford v. Langford, 5 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 60 (1835); Fripp 
v. Bridgewater Canal Co., 3 W. R. 356 (1855); Vermont & Canada R. R. 
v. Vermont Central R. R., 46 Vt. 792 (1873); cf. Turner v. Turner, 15 Jur. 
218 (1850). Judgment creditor or sheriff acting on his behalf required 
to abandon levy and restore property seized or its value: Russell v. East 
Anglian Ry., supra note 15, at 100, 114-115, 117-119 (1850); Hawkins v. 
Gathercole, 1 Drewry 12, 17-20 (1852); De Winton v. Mayor of Brecon, 28 
Beav. 200 (1860); Lane v. Sterne, 3 Giff. 629 (1862); Commonwealth v. 
Young, 11 Phil. 606 (Pa. 1876). Creditor required to abandon garnishment 
of claims payable to a receiver: Ames v. Trustees of the Birkenhead Docks, 
20 Beav. 332 (1855); cf. Chafee v. Quidnick Co., 13 R. I. 442 (1881). Goods 
replevied from receiver ordered returned: In re Vogel, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 
16,983 (S. D. N. Y. 1869). Landlord dispossessing bankrupt required to 
give possession of premises to assignee in bankruptcy: In re Steadman, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 13,330 (N. D. Ga. 1873). Vessel taken under distress 
warrant restored to receiver: Noe v. Gibson, 7 Paige 513 (N. Y. 1839). The same result as in the foregoing cases is often accomplished by injuct- 
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ment suffices to abate or repair an obstruction of the due course 
of justice, the summary power, if it is limited by its policy, does 
not extend to punishment. But when a contemnor is so con- 
tumacious-i.e., so resistant to performance of or non-inter- 
ference with specific legal duties incident to litigation that it 
seems impracticable to abate his obstructive conduct except by 
punishment, he is punishable. The object, however, is not puni- 
tive. It is the same as that of a requirement of desistance or 
reparation. Lord Eldon declined to punish for a forcible taking 
from a messenger in bankruptcy because he could not do so 
unless the taking was contumacious-a question which, since 
the property had been restored to proper custody, he declined 
to investigate; the messenger might if he saw fit pursue a 
remedy at law.27 If the object of the contempt power has been 
or can be effected otherwise, or if it cannot be effected at all, 
reason for summary punishment fails.'s Any cr'ime involved in 
a contempt belongs to the criminal law. 
But five cases before 1877 have been found in which persons 
who had disturbed the possession of a sequestrator or receiver 
tion on petition, instead of in contempt proceedings: Skip v. Harwood, 3 
Atk. 565 (17417); Ex parte Cochrane, L. R. 20 Eq. 282 (1875); HIGII, op. 
cit. supra note 6, at § 747; CLARK, Op. cit. supra note 24, at § 63-3. 
In England, since the Judicature Acts, if a person taking property from 
a receiver without leave is found to be entitled to possession as against the 
receiver, the court, making such order as the justice of the case requires, 
authorizes his retention, and does not even require him to pay the costs 
of the contempt proceeding. Searle v. Choat, 25 Ch. Div. 723 (1884); 
In re Henry Pound, Son & Hutchins, 42 Ch. Div. 402 (1889). 
In a contest for possession between two receivers, one state and one Fed- 
eral, there were in terrorenl findings of contempt; but the conflict was 
settled by a deal between the rival judgment creditors. Spinning v. Ohio 
Life Insurance & Trust Co., 2 Disney 336 (Ohio 1858); Bell v. Ohio Life 
Insurance & Trust Co., Fed. Cas. No. 1,260 (C.C. S. D. Ohio 1858). 
'7 Ex parte Page, 17 Ves. Jr. 59 (1810). 
2s The confusion as to "civil and criminal contempts" arises from the 
habit of seeking definitions of particular crimes and torts. If we sub- 
stitute for the question whether a particular contempt is civil or c?riminal 
the question whether punishment is "necessary" to secure due performance 
of legal duties incident to litigation, the haze blows away. The same sort 
of obstruction with the same sort of object may in some circumstances be 
remediable without punishment, in others not. 
For discussions of the subject, not altogether satisfactory, see Beale, 
Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil (1908) 21 HARV. L. REV. 161; 4 
BL. COMM. 285; Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 31 
Sup. Ct. 492 (1911). 
The nature of the contempt power is more fully discussed in an article 
entitled The Reasonable Scope and Limits of the Summary Power to Pun- 
ish for Contempt, shortly to appear in the COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW. It is 
not pretended that judicial practice is consistently in accord with the views 
expressed. But the harmony is much closer than the sensational contempt 
cases which come first to mind might seem to indicate. 
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were summarily punished. In all, the disturbance seems to have 
been on behalf of a pre-receivership interest, in flagrantly con- 
tumacious disregard of the rule that no right or claim may be 
enforced in such an interest save as allowed by the chancellor. 
In one it was in the interest of the defendant whose goods had 
been impounded.29 In another a judgment creditor of the de- 
fendant, after his own attorney had been enjoined from pro- 
ceeding under the judgments, himself instituted proceedings 
to garnish claims of the defendant payable to the receiver and 
avowed his purpose to persist in efforts to collect his judgments 
notwithstanding the receivership, which he deemed a nullity.30 
In the other three cases the relation of the disturber to the in- 
terests cognizable in the equity suit was not stated; but the 
inference is strong that the disturbance was on behalf of a 
party or claimant.3' 
It may seem fortuitous that power to deal summarily with 
disturbance of a receivership had been used mainly, if not ex- 
clusively, within what may be called the family circle of the 
29 Lord Pelham v. Duchess of Newcastle, 3 Swanst. 284 (1713). Seques- 
trators having sequestered at Paris House certain goods of the defendant 
Duchess, they were forcibly dispossessed by persons acting under Grand- 
man, the Duchess's solicitor, who was committed. 
3 Richards v. People, 81 Ill. 551 (1876). 
31Harvey v. Harvey, 2 Ch. Cas. 82 (1681). "Sir Thomas Harvey, the 
Plaintiff, had a Decree against the Defendant, for the Surplus of the Es- 
tate of Sir John Harvey as Residuary Legatee: The process to discover 
the estate went so far as a Sequestration, and Sir Thomas Hanmer was 
prosecuted on Contempt, for that the House wherein the Testator's Goods 
were, being secured, and the Trunks by former Order lock'd and sealed, 
Affidavit was made that a Smith in Disguise on Friday broke open the 
House, that then the Chests, etc., were opened, and carried away, and 
Goods, etc., and that Sir Thomas Hanmer was then there with others, 
and he being now prosecuted for the Contempt, was ordered to be examined 
on Debate." Nothing is stated as to Sir Thomas Hanmer's relation to 
the suit. But it seems highly probable that if he was not himself a party 
to the suit in which the surplus of the estate had been decreed to the plain- 
tiff, he was acting in the interests of a party and contumaciously with 
respect to the decree. 
Marsh v. Goodall, unreported, M. R. Jan. 1857, Reg. Lib. B 288, Vol. 1 
SrTON, FORMS OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS (7th ed. 1912) 454. Persons 
(presumably defendants in the suit or their agents) were summarily com- 
mitted for their contempt in distraining for rent and persuading tenants 
not to attorn after the appointment of a receiver. 
Broad v. Wickham, 4 Sim. 511 (1831). In a brief decision upon an 
ex parte motion Sir Lancelot Shadwell, V. C., directed that "a Person" who 
"had taken forcible possession of the Estates in the Cause, over which 
a Receiver had been appointed," be summarily committed, overruling the 
refusal of the Registrar to issue an attachment without opportunity to the 
alleged contemnor to show cause why he should not be attached. It is of 
course possible that the "Person" was a complete stranger to any interest 
in litigation in the cause. But it seems unlikely. 
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receivership, to prevent disorderly assertion of interests in the 
impounded res on behalf of members of that circle. It may 
seem that this indicates only that outsiders were not so audacious 
as to break in, and not that the power was felt as circumscribed 
by the circle. 
This is to some extent rebutted by the only instances noted 
prior to 1877 of collision between receiverships and social un- 
rest. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century the 
Irish peasantry was not unnaturally turbulent. Receiverships 
of Irish estates were common. A receiver distrained upon a 
tenant for rent. The tenant "rescued the distress." A motion 
to attach him for contempt was denied. "I have no jurisdic- 
tion," said the Master of the Rolls, "to interfere in this case." 32 
Another Irish receiver could not collect his rents. HIe had been 
assaulted and his life threatened. He obtained a writ of as- 
sistance requiring the sheriff to give him police protection. It 
was not contemplated that persons interfering or resisting 
should be punished for contempt. They were, like other law- 
breakers, to be turned over to the criminal courts. A magis- 
trate of the locality was directed to assist the sheriff.33 The 
writ of assistance had little of the quality of process in litiga- 
tion.34 It was in effect a commission to the sheriff to organize 
32 Fitzpatrick v. Eyre, 1 Hogan 171 (1824). For the benefit of any 
reader to whom the technical reason stated may seem adequate to explain 
it, the decision is quoted in full: "I have no jurisdiction to interfere in 
this case. The receiver is proceeding to enforce the rent by a common 
law remedy; and he can have no remedy for this rescue but at the common 
law, or under the statutes which apply to rescue of distress, and those 
remedies are various and effectual. Had this tenant used any violence 
towards the receiver (who is an officer of this court) or threatened to use 
any, I would attach him, but not otherwise." 
33 Dillon v. Dillon, Irish Chancery, 7th March, 1825, stated in SMITH, 
TREATISE ON THE DUTIES AND OFFICE OF A RECEIVER (3d ed. 1836) 146. 
The magistrate specified in the order for the writ was himself a defendant 
in the cause, and was said to have encouraged interference with the re- 
ceiver's collections. Contempt proceedings against such a contumacious 
defendant would have been a different matter from contempt proceedings 
against the rebellious peasants. Compatibly with the view that jurisdic- 
tion depends on connection with the suit, the tenants might have been 
deemed in contempt if their resistance of the receiver's collections was on 
the ground of the defendant-landlord's right to the rents as against the 
receiver. 
34 The writ of assistance is a process in rem. Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 
1 Ves. Sr. 444, 454 (1750); 2 MADDOCK, CHANCERY PRACTICE (3d Am. ed. 
1827) 469-470. It is a command to the sheriff to use force, not to transmit 
an order. It was ordinarily issued only as a last resort, after a person in 
wrongful possession has disregarded a tautological cumulation of orders 
and process in personam. Dove v. Dove, Dick. 618 (1783); Kershaw v. 
Thompson, 4 Johns. Ch. 609 (N. Y. 1820) ; DANIELL, op. cit. supra note 
6, at 1062-3. But when the writ was sought to put a receiver in posses- 
sion as against a defendant or his tenants, less preliminary formality 
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and direct a military force for the protection of the receiver. 
It did not, however, amount to a declaration of martial law 
under which the chancellor, superseding the criminal courts, 
would deal with offenders somewhat as at drum-head court 
martial. 
In modern British usage, though judicial language has not 
conceded the limitation, the contempt power has continued to 
operate only within the family circle of the receivership. Its 
furthest reach has been when a party to the cause, or a person 
closely connected in interest with a party, has been restrained 
from unfair competition with the receiver as manager,35 or 
from hiring away the receiver's employees.36 A different picture 
is presented when an American court restrains an outsider from 
competition with a receiver.37 
IV. THE RIGHT TO SUE RECEIVERS WITHOUT LEAVE 
In other respects than in its restraint in use of the contempt 
power, British usage has been continuously consistent with lim- 
itation of the special privileges and immunities of a receivership 
to its family circle. Even in England, however, this limitation 
is not explicitly acknowledged by judicial language. And usage 
in the United States, though very considerably influenced by in- 
articulate feeling of its reasonableness, has been in important 
respects inconsistent with it. 
A managing receiver acquires in the course of business claims 
in tort and contract against outsiders. Sometimes such a claim 
is summarily determined "in the cause;" sometimes it is re- 
mitted to plenary suit. Unless the interests involved are trifling, 
or the outsider's defense is clearly insubstantial, or the outsider 
consents to summary disposition, the court's own sense of fitness 
usually ordains trial in a plenary suit. When a plenary suit at 
law is authorized by a Federal judge in equity, he may require 
that it be brought in the Federal court,38 and he himself-though 
usually he will not if another judge is available-may sit in it. 
If it is in fact true that the receiver's possession and manage- 
was required. Sharp v. Carter, 3 P. Wms. 375n (1735). The command 
of the writ was that the sheriff or marshal put and keep the person en- 
titled in quiet possession. For forms, see 1 GRANT, CHANCERY PRACTICE 
(5th ed. 1845) 606; SETON, op. cit. supra note 31, at 417. 
3' Helmore v. Smith, 35 Ch. Div. 449 (1886); cf. In re Woven Tape 
Skirt Co., 12 Hun 111 (N. Y. 1877). 
36Dixon v. Dixon, [1904] 1 Ch. Div. 161; see KERR, op. cit. supra note 
11, at 310n. Cf. In re Gent, 40 W. R. 267 (1892). 
37 Brady v. South Shore Traction Co., 197 Fed. 669 (E. D. N. Y. 1912). 
That the summary jurisdiction extends to restraining an outsider from un- 
just discrimination against a receiver was, however, denied in Wood v. 
New York & New England R.R., 61 Fed. 236 (C. C. Mass. 1894). 
38 Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473, 479, 13 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1010 (1893). 
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ment are the possession and management of the court itself, it 
follows that, in ancillary suits as well as in summary proceed- 
ings, the court sits as judge in its own case in violation of an 
elementary principle of due process of law. But objection on 
that ground would be felt as merely technical. For satisfactory 
justice is the rule in both sorts of ancillary civil proceedings 
against outsiders. The question of the outsider's right to have 
his obligations to a receivership determined in an independent 
suit in another court has never become important. 
Outsiders acquire claims against businesses managed by 
receivers. Theoretical objections to chancery control of 
proceedings to establish such claims have been reinforced in 
this country by practical objections. In England a receiver 
has always been suable in other courts without leave of the 
chancellor on claims of outsiders arising during his own man- 
agement.39 The question of leave to sue on such claims has 
never there been important. For he is sued, not in his official 
capacity as receiver and manager, but personally. This is a 
strong recognition that as to those with whom he comes in 
contact as such, he is the manager of a private business and 
not an officer of the court. If his management has given rise 
to liabilities in tort or contract, he must pay; the question 
whether he incurred the liability in the course of his official 
duty, and is therefore entitled to indemnity from the property 
in his hands, is one between him and the chancellor.4 
An antagonism in the United States courts toward the Eng- 
lish usage of suing as freely for injuries when their infliction 
was incident to the operation of a business by a receiver as 
when it was incident to a private operation of business made 
the status of operating receiverships with respect to the general 
public an important object of attention until 1887. Obviously, 
when a farmer's cow is killed or a passenger or brakeman is 
injured by a receiver's train, it is not the court which inflicts 
the injury, nor is the administration of justice obstructed by 
legal exaction of reparation for it if it is tortious. The Federal 
courts had to a considerable extent recognized the incongruity- 
or at least the impracticality-of investing the operation of a 
receivership railway with special privileges. Receivers were 
required to pay debts as they accrued-taxes, wages, bills for 
39 Aston v. Heron, 2 Myl. & K. 390 (1834). Lord Brougham asserted the 
power to enjoin actions of tort against a receiver on good grounds. 
But 
they may, without leave, be prosecuted to judgment unless enjoined. 
"Surely," he said, "it would be preposterous to contend that this 
court 
alone could punish or redress wrongs like these-preposterous to apprehend 
any peril to its jurisdiction--puerile to imagine that its dignity 
would 
sustain any diminution if the wrongdoer (i.e., the receiver) were left 
to 
answer for his offense before a jury." 
40 KERR, op. cit. supra note 11, at 299-309. 
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materials, adjustments with other railways, damages for goods 
lost in transportation.4' But, anomalously, tort claimants might 
not liquidate the amount of their claims by suit, let alone en- 
force payment of judgments. To sue a receiver without leave, 
even for injuries incident to his own operation, was said to be 
a contempt of the court that appointed him.42 And many Fed- 
eral judges were prejudiced against tort claims.43 Until Judge 
Caldwell broke the practice by granting a blanket leave to sue 
in an order appointing a receiver, "leave to sue a railroad re- 
ceiver in a court of law was rarely given.' The duty to con- 
serve the property for pre-receivership interests was deemed a 
reason for denying it. The procedure by petition in the receiver- 
ship suit "was attended with great delay, costs and inconvenience 
to the claimant. On the other hand, it was found extremely 
convenient and profitable to the railroad company and its bond- 
holders to have the litigation growing out of the operation of 
the road carried on in a chancery court far removed from the 
locality where the cause of action arose and the claimant and 
his witnesses resided." 44 A railway employee injured, without 
negligence on his own part, in the course of his duties, might 
deem himself lucky if a special master, finding him "faithful 
and deserving," recommended that the court, as a gratuity, al- 
low him his wages for the time he was incapcitated.45 
The Supreme Court confirmed these practices by its decision 
in Barton v. Barbour,46 holding an averment that the plaintiff 
had not obtained leave to sue a good defence to an action by a 
passenger for injury in an accident caused by a defective rail. 
The majority opinion could see no difference between suits 
against the receiver on claims incident to his own management 
and suits to effectuate pre-receivership interests. The adminis- 
41Cowdery v. Galveston R.R., 93 U. S. 352 (1876); Wallace v. Loomis, 
97 U. S. 146 (1877). 
42 Thompson v. Scott, 4 Dill. C. C. 508 (D. Iowa 1876). 
43 Till 1887 decisions as to tort claims against Federal receivers rarely 
got into the reports. The attitude is illustrated by the line of cases hold- 
ing that an employee of a railway receiver can claim no benefit from a 
statute providing that employees of railway companies shall not be subject 
to the fellow servant rule. For a receiver is not a railway company. Cen- 
tral Trust Co. v. East Tennessee Ry., 69 Fed. 353 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1888). 44 Caldwell, Railroad Receiverships in the Federal Courts (1896) 30 AM. 
L. REV. 161, 165. Judge Caldwell conceded that claimants were more 
liberally treated by juries than by special masters and chancellors and 
that scattered local suits would subject the receiver to inconvenience and 
the estate to expense. "But why," he asked, "should a court of equity 
deprive a citizen of his constitutional right of trial by jury, and subject 
him to inconvenience and loss, to make money for a railroad corporation 
and its bondholders?" 
45 See Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Texas & P. Ry., 33 Fed. 701 (C. C. E. D 
La. 1888). 
46104 U. S. 126, 128-130, 133 (1881). 
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tration of justice in the equity suit, the court thought, involved 
the ascertainment of priorities and equities not only among pre- 
receivership claims but also among claims incident to the re- 
ceiver's management.47 And it was conceived that to admit 
suits for personal injuries or for wages would not only "permit 
the trust property to be wasted in the costs of unnecessary liti- 
gation" but would also result in inequitable collections of the 
full amounts of claims liquidated by the suits. The argument 
that tort claimants would lose their right of trial by jury was 
condemned as ignoring the fundamental principle that that right 
"does not extend to cases of equitable jurisdiction." 
Justice Miller, dissenting, perceived and stated the distinction 
which has been here stressed.4s It was more clearly stated later, 
however, by Judge Caldwell in his opinion granting blanket leave 
to sue: 
"Where property is in the hands of a receiver simply as cus- 
todian, or for sale or distribution, it is proper that all persons 
having claims against it, or upon the fund arising from its sale, 
should be required to assert them in the court appointing the 
receiver; [but] when a court, through its receiver, becomes a 
common carrier, and enters the lists to compete with other com- 
mon carriers for the carrying trade of the country, it ought not 
to claim or exercise any special privileges denied to its com- 
petitors, and oppressive on the citizen." 49 
47 Sometimes indeed it did. All valid claims incident to the receiver's 
management must of course be paid before anything can be paid to pre- 
receivership interests-except on claims, as for wages or supplies, which 
have prriority in the interest of maintaining the busines s a a going con- 
cern. And when railways were "milked" through receiverships, and a 
bankruptcy of the receivership superimposed upon the bankruptcy of the 
prior management, there was sometimes nothing at all left for the pre- 
receivership interests for whose theoretical benefit the receivership was 
undertaken. In the Illinois Midland case, for example, there were thirteen 
issues of receiver's certificates, and the controversy as to participation in 
the proceeds of sale was between their holders and other creditors of the 
receivership. A practical way to deal with such a situation might be to 
surcharge both the receiver and the judge who appointed him. When 
receiverships are not undertaken or are protracted without due regard 
for their ability to pay their own way, it is hard to see why claims arising 
during the receiver's management may not properly be both liquidated by 
judgment and collected under legal process. If in occasional instances 
there is reason why the enforcement of such claims should be regulated 
by a court of equity, injunctions against their enforcement without its 
leave would be sufficient. See Aston v. Heron, supra note 39. 
48 104 U. S. at 138-9; this is the same opinion that was cited supra 
note 22. 
49 Dow v. Memphis & Little Rock R.R., 20 Fed. 260, 268 (1884). Judge 
Caldwell did not authorize the enforcement against the receivership corpus 
of claims liquidated by judgments of other courts without leave of the 
chancellor. This qualification of outsiders' rights, though illogical, has 
become as a practical matter unobjectionable. 
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This opinion contributed to the settlement-a compromise- 
of the specific issue of the right to sue receivers without leave. 
Three years later Congress provided that a Federal receiver 
might be sued without leave "in respect of any act or transaction 
of his in carrying on the business" under his management. 
There was a proviso, however, that suits without leave should 
be "subject to the general equity jurisdiction" of the court in 
which he was appointed so far as "may be necessary to the ends 
of justice." 50 The Supreme Court, restraining a tendency of the 
circuit courts to construe the proviso as nullifying the right,51 
held it to mean only that the Federal court in equity may con- 
trol the time and manner of paying judgments obtained else- 
where so as to prevent inequitable priorities; it must, however, 
treat judgments elsewhere as conclusive of the validity and 
amount of the claims adjudicated.52 So in a proper receivership 
properly conducted a judgment elsewhere without leave on a 
claim incident to the receiver's operation is fully valid and ef- 
fective.53 
Other grievances against special privileges enjoyed by busi- 
nesses run by Federal receivers were lessened by another section 
of the same Act of Congress requiring Federal receivers to 
manage property "according to the requirements of the valid 
laws of the state in which such property shall be situated, in 
the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be 
bound to do if in possession thereof." 54 
V. SUMMARY PUNISHMENTS OF STATE OFFICERS FOR UNDUE 
ENFORCEMENT OF STATE POLICIES 
Another hot grievance arose, however, in South Carolina under 
Governor "Pitch-fork Ben" Tillman at the height of the Populist 
uprising. A receiver defaulted in the payment of a tax, claim- 
ing that it was based upon an excessive and discriminatory val- 
uation of the railway property under his management. A 
sheriff distrained excessively upon freight cars, in restraint of 
interstate commerce and in violation of the private rights of 
50 24 STAT. 554 (1887), 28 U. S. C. § 125 (1926); 28 U. S. C. A. § 125. 
51 See Central Trust Co. v. East Tennessee Ry., 59 Fed. 523 (C. C. Ky. 
1894). 
52 Cases cited in Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218, 226n., 49 Sup. Ct. 
310, 313n. (1929). 
53 Such a judgment is not to be confused with a judgment in another 
court in a suit instituted before the receivership against a defendant whose 
property is put in the hands of a receiver during its pendency. Such a 
judgment, by a statute qualifying what has been said here as to chancery 
control of pre-receivership claims, is now conclusive as to the amount and 
validity of the claim adjudged. See supra note 52. But there is no 
presumption or probability that it will be fully collectible. 
54 36 STAT. 1104 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 124 (1926). 
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shippers and consignees. In a summary proceeding in the suit 
in which the receiver had been appointed, the court enjoined 
the collection of the tax until its validity should have been deter- 
mined in a proper proceeding and ordered the sheriff to dis- 
charge his levy on the cars.55 For disobedience of this injunc- 
tion the sheriff was punished for contempt, and the Supreme 
Court sustained the Circuit Court's summary jurisdiction.56 
Somewhat contemporaneously, a constable seized without war- 
rant an undelivered consignment of liquor from a freight ware- 
house of the same receiver as being within the state in violation 
of its Dispensary Laws. On the return of an order to show 
cause why he should not be punished for contempt he defended 
the seizure and made no offer to restore the liquor-which, hav- 
ing been delivered to a sheriff, was indeed no longer under his 
control. He was sentenced to be imprisoned until he should re- 
store the liquor and for three months thereafter. The jurisdic- 
tion of the court to do this was sustained by the Supreme Court.57 
The illegality of the conduct both of the sheriff in the tax 
case and of the constable in the liquor case scarcely admits of 
question. But it is to be noted that both were acting in support 
of policies strongly and not unnaturally sustained by dominant 
feeling in the state. A sense of the vindictive discrimination 
involved in Populist railway taxation should not obliterate the 
fact that the resentment which it expressed was reasonable. 
The extravagances in which that resentment resulted were per- 
haps necessary conditions precedent to a willingness of Con- 
gress to force railways to behave reasonably. The reasonable- 
ness and propriety of the policy of the state's Dispensary Laws 
are obvious. And resentment at its emasculation under cover 
of the constitutional limitation created by Bowman v. Chicago & 
Northwestern Ry.58 and Leisy v. Hardin 59 may perhaps be con- 
ceded to have been both natural and just. 
In view of the unlawfulness of the acts of both the sheriff 
and the constable, the only holdings in the contempt cases 
which natural resentment could condemn without confusing its 
objects were those sustaining summary Federal jurisdiction by 
reason of the receivership. The Memorial to Congress by the 
Legislature of South Carolina 6 did not, to be sure, avoid con- 
fusion of issues. Nor was it cool or fair. Bu- the inflated 
language of its analysis of legal history unreasonably expressed 
a reasonable view of the anomaly of operating receiverships and 
55Ex parte Chamberlain, 55 Fed. 704 (C. C. S. C. 1893). 
56 In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 13 Sup. Ct. 785 (1893). 
57In re Swan, 150 U. S. 637, 14 Sup. Ct. 225 (1893). 
58125 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 689 (1888). 
59 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681 (1890). 
60 (1894) 28 AM. L. REV. 161. 
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of the special privileges for private business which they had 
unnecessarily established.61 Had the receiver proceeded against 
the tax and the liquor seizures not summarily but as a domestic 
corporation of South Carolina would have been obliged to pro- 
ceed, the results would have been the same in the end; and 
resentment at the attrition of popular policies would not have 
been convertible into an outraged sense of subjection to judicial 
tyranny. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The South Carolina grievances merged and disappeared into 
those of the Bryan campaign. The leave to sue controversy sub- 
sided after the compromise act of 1887. The punishment of 
strike activities as contempt of receiverships ceased with the 
establishment of the labor injunction;' 3 and labor resentment, 
many times multiplied, shifted to that legal institution. Lat- 
terly, the nearest to an occasion for popular attack upon the 
theory that interference with a receivership, in its management 
aspect, is obstruction of the administration of justice, was when 
Judge Mayer punished Comptroller Craig of New York City 
for statements as to his conduct of a street railway receiver- 
ship.?3 Popular attack was averted by a Presidential pardon. 
It may now seem academic to insist that the theory that the 
operation of a business by a receiver is an agency for the court 
and not for private interests is contrary to fact, and to urge 
that it be discarded because it is a legal fiction. Many unob- 
jectionable judicial practices have developed through that fic- 
tion. But insofar as they are beneficent, their survival will 
not depend upon the survival of the fiction. Its abandonment, 
moreover, would not only serve the reality and coherence of law 
61 Stripped of rhetorical extravagance the one-sidedness of the South 
Carolina argument might scem no greater than that of Judge Taft's an- 
swer to it in an address to the American Bar Association, Criticisms of the 
Federal Judiciary (1895) 29 AI. L. REV. 641. 
G2 It is interesting to note that the last reported summary punishment- 
by Taft, J., in 1894, sipra note 7-for unlawful interference with a re- 
ceivership in a strike was incident to the same strike in which the Su- 
preme Court, by its decision in In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 
900 (1895), may be deemed, regardless of its specific holdings, to have 
firmly established the labor injunction. 
63 United States v. Craig, 266 Fed. 230 (S. D., N. Y. 1920) and 279 
Fed. 900 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); habeas corpus granted, Ex parte Craig, 274 Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); dismissed, 282 Fed. 138 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922); 
dismissal aff'd, 263 U. S. 255, 44 Sup. Ct. 103 (1923). Mr. Craig's reliance 
upon habeas corpus when an appeal was open to him was held to preclude 
review of the correctness of his conviction. The concurring opinion of 
Taft, C. J., as well as the dissent of Holmes, J., leave it questionable 
whether Judge Mayer's holding that Mr. Craig's statements obstructed 
the administration of justice would, if reviewed, have been sustained. 
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but might also prevent occasional summary adjustments of pri- 
vate rights in contempt cases where the arbitrary procedure, if 
nothing more, may sometimes raise doubt as to the justice of 
the result.64 
To return to the starcing point of this inqury: A question for 
lawyers raised by the punishments for contempt in 1877 is 
whether they were within the policy of a power which theoreti- 
cally exists only to the extent that its exercise is "necessary" 
to prevent obstruction of the administration of justice. Whether 
conduct tends to obstruct the administration of justice is a ques- 
tion of fact. Judge Drummond might have directed the Federal 
District Attorneys who appeared in the cases to proceed by in- 
dictment in order that the question of fact might be determined 
by a jury.65 He must have charged, in the language of the 
Federal criminal statute, that the defendants should be acquitted 
unless the evidence established that they had by threats or force 
obstructed, or impeded, or endeavoured to obstruct or impede, 
the due administration of justice in a court of the United States. 
How many lawyers, as jurymen-what they might argue as 
lawyers is another matter-would have found the defendants 
guilty? 
64 If a person disputing a claim of lien by the receiver of a ship-yard 
'takes rom the receiver's possession his own boat, which the receiver had 
had for repairs, may he be punished for contempt? See In re Dialogue, 
215 Fed. 462 (D. N. J. 1914); cf. In re Day, 34 Wis. 638 (1874); United 
States v. Jose, 63 Fed. 951 (C. C. N. D. Wash. 1894); National Corp. v. 
Bartram Hotel Co., 263 Fed. 250 (E. D. Pa. 1920), aff'd, 263 Fed. 250 
(C. C. A. 3d, 1920). 
Is it fitting that a claim by a solvent railway of a joint right to use 
tracks of a railway in the hands of a receiver should be determined in a 
contempt proceeding? Lake Shore Ry. v. Felton, 103 Fed. 227 (C. C. A. 
6th, 1900); cf. Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Columbus Ry., 95 Fed. 18 (C. C. 
S. D. Ohio 1899). See also the competition cases cited supra notes 35-37. 
To what extent may a Federal receivership arrest the enforcement of 
state criminal law against a receiver? See United States v. Murphy, 44 
Fed. 39 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 1890). Cf. supra note 24. 
If a receivership loses money through a bank failure caused by an 
absconding cashier who had knowledge of the receiver's deposits, is the 
cashier summarily punishable for contempt? Even the summary punish- 
ment (not a requirement to restore, but definitely punitive) of a receiver 
himself for misappropriating $10,000 raises a question. Cartwright's 
Case, 114 Mass. 230 (1873). 
65 Under the statute which is now 31 STAT. 188 (1900), 18 U. S. C. § 
391 (1926). It was originally § 2 of the contempt statute of 1831, of 
which § 1 is quoted supra note 8. 
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